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Wireless ad hoc network is a collection of mobile nodes dynamically 
forming a temporary network without a centralized administration. 
This kind of network has been applied for both civilian and military 
purposes. However, security in wireless ad hoc networks is hard to 
achieve due to the vulnerability of the links, the limited physical pro-
tection of the nodes, and the absence of a certification authority or 
centralized niaiiagement point. Consequently, novel approaches are 
necessary to address the security problem and to corporate with the 
properties of wireless ad hoc network. Similar to other distributed sys-
tems, security in wireless ad hoc networks usually relies on the use of 
different key management mechanisms. Authentication service estab-
lishes the valid identities of communicating nodes. The compromise of 
the authentication service breaks down the whole security system. 
In this work, we present a public key authentication service to pro-
tect security in the network in the presence of malicious nodes. Nodes 
originally trust-worthy in the network may be compromised after the 
attacks. These malicious nodes can harm the authentication service by 
signing false certificates, so adequate measure is essential to protect the 
network security. W e develop a novel aiitlientication service based on 
trust and clustering models. It involves a well-defined network model 
and a trust model. W e make use of a clustering formation algorithm 
and propose some clustering structure maintenance algorithms to keep 
the network in a balance clustering structure. This structure supports 
our trust model and allows nodes in the network to monitor and rate 
each other with an authentication metric. W e also propose some se-
curity operations, including public key certification, identification of 
suspicious nodes, and trust value update algorithm. Our authenti-
cation service is able to discover and isolate malicious nodes in the 
network. Finally, we perform security evaluation on the proposed so-
lution through simulations. W e simulate the network with malicious 
i 
nodes and measure a number of metrics. Comparisons and analyzes 
are made between our approach and the Pretty Good Privacy with dis-
tributed certificate repository to demonstrate the effectiveness of our 
scheme. In addition, clustering structure formation and maintenance 
algorithms are implemented to study the network behavior in terms 
of the node mobility and the balance of clustering structure. Finally, 
neighbor monitoring and strategies on identification of suspicious nodes 
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Wireless ad hoc network is a collection of mobile devices forming a 
network without any supporting infrastructure or prior organization. 
Nodes in the network should be able to sense and discover with nearby 
nodes [22]. Due to the limited transmission range of wireless network 
interfaces, multiple network "hops" may be needed for one node to 
exchange data with another across the network [13]. There are a num-
ber of characteristics in wireless ad-hoc networks, such as the dynamic 
network topology, roaming of the nodes, limited bandwidth and en-
ergy constrain in the network. A crucial difference between ad hoc 
networks and traditional networks is the lack of central administration 
or control. This factor leads to a serious problem in network security 
with the limited physical security on wireless communication. Mobile 
wireless networks are generally more prone to physical security threats 
than are fixed-cable nets. The increased possibility of eavesdropping, 
spoofing, and denial-of-service attacks should be carefully considered 
[20]. In protecting this vulnerable network from different attacks, the 
availability of security services is very important [44 . 
The most common way to protect the network security is done by 
1 
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encryption and decryption of the messages. Public key cryptography 
has been recognized as one of the most effective mechanism for provid-
ing security service like authentication, digital signature, and encryp-
tion. Public key cryptography usually relies on the Certificate Author-
ity (CA) to sign and validate digital certificates. Public key infrastruc-
ture (PKI) is deployed in wired network and some infrastructure-based 
wireless network. Security requirements for CAs are important with an 
exploration of the wide range of attackers that can be mounted against 
CAs [45). Popular network authentication architectures include X.509 
standard [37] and Kerberos [46]. Another paper suggests make use of 
interoperation between many small, independent certificate authorities 
to build a global-scale public-key infrastructure [25]. However, tra-
ditional key distribution scliemes are not suitable for wireless ad hoc 
networks due to its network characteristics. Therefore, new security 
services are necessary to protect the network security in wireless ad 
hoc network. 
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [1, 29] is proposed by following a web-
of-trust authentication model. P G P uses digital signatures as its form 
of introduction. When any user signs for another user's key, he or she 
becomes an introducer of that key. As this process goes on, a web 
or trust is established [38]. Its distributed manner in certification is 
compatible with the characteristics of ad hoc networks. An approach 
similar to P G P for security in wireless ad hoc networks is proposed in 
[14，36]. That paper presents the idea of trust graph and the method 
of finding a certificate chain from one user to another. However, it as-
sumes that users are honest and do not issue false certificates, though it 
briefly suggests that this assumption could be rela:xed by the introduc-
tion of some sort of authentication metric. Although an authentication 
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metric represents the assurance that a user can obtain the authentic 
public key of another, it is hard to be estimated accurately. There is 
still possibility for a node turns from trustable to malicious in a sudden 
attack. The ability for detecting such misbehavior and the isolation of 
malicious nodes are important in public key authentication. In this the-
sis, we provide a secure authentication service that can defend malicious 
nodes in the network. In addition, we find that it is common to see 
performance evaluation on new security protocols proposed, but rare 
to see security evaluation on those works by experiment. Therefore, 
we carry out a series of simulation to evaluation the security provided 
by the authentication service we propose. W e emulate a network with 
malicious nodes, which can harm authentication by issuing false certifi-
cate. The experiment shows that our authentication service performs 
well in protecting the authentication even in this hostile environment. 
The remaining of this thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 dis-
cusses the related work on the current key management systems, clus-
tering techniques and trust valuation metliods for ad hoc networks. 
Section 3 formalizes the system architecture, the network model and 
the trust model which lay the foundation for our design. In Section 
4, we further present the security operations on the public key certifi-
cation and the update of trust tables. The new solution is evaluated 
through simulation in Section 5. W e fix and vary different parameters 
in the wireless ad hoc network and estimate its security performance in 
terms of the successful rate, fail rate, unreachable rate, false-positive 
error rate, and false-negative error rate. W e also study the convergence 
time, effect of mobility, and make comparison of our security scheme 
with the P G P approach with distributed certificate repositories. The 
clustering formation and maintenance algorithms, and various suspi-
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cious nodes identification strategies are evaluated. Finally, we conclude 
the thesis in Section 6. 
• E n d of chapter. 
Chapter 2 
Background Study 
2.1 Mobile A d H o c Networks 
2.1.1 Definition 
Mobile ad hoc network is a collection of wireless mobile nodes dy-
namically forming a temporary network without the use of any existing 
network infrastructure or centralized administration. Due to the lim-
ited transmission range of wireless network interfaces, multiple network 
"hops" may be needed for one node to exchange data with another 
across the network [13 . 
2.1.2 Characteristics 
There are a number of characteristics in mobile ad-hoc networks. 
One of theni is that there are dynamic topologies. Nodes are free to 
move arbitrarily. Thus, the network topology is typically multi-hop, 
so may change randomly and rapidly at unpredictable times. Another 
characteristic is bandwidth-constrained. Wireless links will continue 
to have significantly lower capacity than their hardwired counterparts. 
Also, there is energy-constrained in the networks. Some or all of the 
5 
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nodes in a mobile ad-lioc network may rely on batteries or other ex-
haustible means for their energy. Finally, there is limited physical se-
curity. Mobile wireless networks are generally more prone to physical 
security threats than are fixed-cable nets. The increased possibility of 
eavesdropping, spoofing, and denial-of-service attacks should be care-
fully considered [20]. 
2 .1 .3 Applications 
Examples of potential practical use of mobile ad-hoc networks may 
be a group of people with laptop computers at a conference that may 
wish to exchange files and data without mediation of any additional 
infrastructure in-between. It may be used in home environment for 
communication between smart household appliances. Ad-hoc networks 
are suitable to be used in areas where earthquake or other natural 
disasters have destroyed communication infrastructures. It perfectly 
satisfies military needs like battlefield survivability, operation without 
pre-placed infrastructure and connectivity beyond the line of sight. For 
monitoring and measuring purposes a large number of small computing 
devices could be spread over a hostile to form a self-sustained ad-hoc 
network. 
Mobile ad-lioc networks have significant advantages above traditional 
communication networks. For example, use of ad-lioc networks could 
increase mobility and flexibility, as ad-hoc networks can be brought up 
and torn down in very short time. Ad-hoc networks could be more 
economical in some cases as they eliminate fixed infrastructure costs 
arid reduce power consumption at mobile nodes. They are more robust 
than conventional wireless networks because of their rioii-liierarchical 
distributed control and management mechanisms. Also, radio einis-
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sion levels could be kept at low level because of short communication 
links (node-to-node instead of node to a central base station). This 
increases spectrum reuse possibility or possibility of using unlicensed 
bands. Moreover, communication beyond Line Of Sight (LOS) is pos-
sible at high frequencies because of multi-hop support in ad-lioc net-
works. 
Despite the mentioned advantages and potential application possi-
bilities, ad-hoc networks are yet far from being deployed on large-scale 
coiiiniercial basis. Some fundamental ad-hoc networking problems re-
niain unsolved or need optimized solutions. Although various routing 
protocols are suggested and tested for mobile ad-hoc networks, perfor-
mance metrics like throughput, delay and protocol overhead in relation 
to successfully transmitted data need better optimization. This opti-
mization would probably also depend on application type and desire 
to maximize the throughput or minimize the delay. One single proto-
col will probably not be able to work efficiently across entire range of 
design parameters and operating conditions. An additional complexity 
factor in ad-hoc network design is that different layers of the system 
are highly interdependent. 
2.1.4 Standards 
IEEE 802.11 
IEEE 802.11 is a digital wireless data transmission standard in the 
2.4 G H z ISM band aimed at providing a wireless L A N between portable 
computers and between portable computers and a fixed network infras-
tructure. This standard defines a physical layer and a M A C layer. The 
most popular technology is the direct sequence spread spectrum and 
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can offer a bit rate of up to 11 Mbps in the 2.4 G H z band, and in the 
future, up to 54Mbps in the 5GHz band. The basic access method in 
the IEEE 802.11 M A C protocol is the Distributed Coordination Func-
tion which is a Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance 
(CSMA/CA) M A C protocol. However, the 802.11 standard cannot do 
miilti-hop networking as it is. The development of a number of proto-
cols is required. The maximum data rate of IEEE 802.11 is 11Mbps. 
Its range is 100 meters [32 . 
Bluetooth 
Bluetooth is a digital wireless data transmission standard operat-
ing in the 2.4 GHz Industrial, Scientific, and Medicine (ISM) band 
aimed at providing a short range wireless link between laptops, cel-
lular phones and other devices. In this band are defines 79 different 
Radio Frequency (RF) channels that are spaced of IMHz. The main 
aim of the Bluetooth Specification is to guarantee the interoperabil-
ity between different applications that may run over different protocol 
stacks. However, in order to implement a wireless multi-hop network 
over Bluetooth, either or both a packet switch layer and a circuit switch 
layer need to be defines on top of the Bluetooth data link layer pro-
tocol. The maximum data rate of Bluetooth is 1Mbps. Its range is 
10 meters. Bluetooth lias lower power consumption than IEEE 802.11. 
Also, Bluetooth support both voice and data packet types while IEEE 
802.11 just support data packet type [32]. 
2.1.5 Routing Protocols 
There are a number of routing protocols have been developed for mo-
bile ad hoc networks. They can be divided into two categories, which 
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the table-driven protocols and the source-initiated on-demand proto-
cols. D S D V belongs to the table-driven protocols. The most popular 
protocols nowadays are the A O D V and D S R protocols. Both of them 
belong to the source-initiated on-demand protocols. W e will briefly 
describe DSDV, A O D V and D S R protocols in the following sections. 
D S D V 
D S D V stands for Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector Routing. 
It is a table-driven algorithm based on the classical Bellman-Ford rout-
ing mechanism. Table-driven routing protocols attempt to maintain 
consistent, up-to-date routing information from each node to every 
other node in the network. These protocols require each node to main-
tain one or more tables to store routing information, and they respond 
to changes in network topology by propagating updates throughout the 
network in order to maintain a consistent network view [21 . 
A O D V 
A O D V stands for Ad Hoc On-Deinand Distance Vector Routing. It 
builds on the D S D V algorithm. It is an improvement on D S D V because 
it typically minimizes the number of required broadcasts by creating 
routes on a demand basis, as opposed to maintaining a complete list of 
routes as in D S D V algorithm. A O D V is classified as a pure on-demand 
route acquisition system, since nodes that are not on a selected path 
do not maintain routing information or participate in routing table 
exchanges. The Figure 2.1 shows how the A O D V route request and 
route reply message flow [21 . 
« 
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Figure 2.1: The AODV routing protocol 
DSR 
D S R stands for Dynamic Source Routing. It is an on-demand routing 
protocol that is based on the concept of source routing Mobile nodes 
are required to maintain route caches that contain the source routes of 
which the mobile is aware. Entries in the route cache are continually 
updated as new routes are learned. The protocol consists of two ma-
jor phases, which are the route discovery and route maintenance. The 
route discovery was initiates by broadcasting a route request packet if 
a node does not have a route to the destination. Route maintenance is 
accomplished through the use of route error packets and acknowledge-
ments. Route error packets are generated at a node when the data link 
layer encounters a fatal transmission problem. The Figure 2.2 shows 
how the D S R route request and route reply message flow [21]. 
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2.2 Security in Mobile A d H o c Networks 
2.2.1 Vulnerabilities 
Due the characteristics of mobile ad hoc networks that we described 
in the previous section, there are a number of vulnerabilities of the 
networks. One characteristic is that mobile ad hoc networks have open 
medium, and lack of clear line of defence. The use of wireless links 
renders a wireless ad-hoc network susceptible to attacks ranging from 
passive eavesdropping to active impersonating, message replay, and 
message distortion. Active attacks might allow the adversary to delete 
messages, to inject erroneous messages, to modify messages, to imper-
sonate a node, thus violating availability, integrity, authentication, and 
non-repudiation. All these mean that a wireless ad-hoc network will 
not have a clear line of defence, and every node must be prepared for 
encounters with an adversary directly or indirectly. 
Another characteristic is that there is dynamic changing topology. 
Mobile nodes are autonomous units that are capable of roaming in-
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dependently. Nodes roaming in a hostile environment with relatively 
poor physical protection, have non-negligible probability of being com-
promised. Therefore, not just external attacks should be considered, 
but attacks launched inside the network by compromised nodes should 
also be dealt with. It means that nodes with inadequate physical pro-
tection are receptive to being captured, compromised, and hijacked. It 
is easy to attach and hard to detect, so any node in a wireless ad-hoc 
network must be prepared to operate in a mode that trusts no peer. 
Moreover, mobile ad hoc network has decentralized management. 
There is lack of centralized monitoring and management point. Decision-
making in ad-hoc networks is usually decentralized and many ad-hoc 
network algoritlinis rely on the cooperative participation of all nodes. 
Ad hoc network are supposed to operate independently of any fixed 
infrastructure. This makes the classical security solutions based on 
certification authorities and on-line servers inapplicable [50]. 
2.2.2 Motivation for the Attacks 
Prom the above description, it is clear to notice that mobile ad hoc 
networks are easy to be attacked. However, it may still be interesting 
to know what is the motivation for attacking the mobile ad hoc net-
works. Some reason is that is it possible to gain various advantages 
by malicious behavior. For example, a node can get better service 
than cooperating nodes, gain monetary benefits by exploiting incen-
tive measures or trading confidential information, save power by selfish 
behavior, extract data to get confidential information, and so on [11.. 
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2.2.3 Types of Attacks 
There are many different types of attacks can be occurred in mobile 
ad hoc networks. One of them is the passive denial-of-service attacks. 
Under this kind of attacks, the misbehaving providers simply do not 
perform the requested function. For example, it may not participate 
to the Route Discovery phase of the protocol. Another type of at-
tack is the active denial-of-service attacks. Under this kind of attacks, 
the malicious node prevent other providers from serving a request by 
communicating bogus information on reputation ratings for legitimate 
nodes, by performing traffic subversion or by using the security mech-
anism itself causing explicit Denial of Service. There are many other 
kinds of attacks. Most common attacks are those against routing and 
forwarding, such as the no forwarding or incorrect forwarding attacks, 
setting incorrect metrics on route for priority and remaining time in 
the cache, frequent route updates, and so on. 
2.3 Cryptography 
2.3.1 Cryptographic goals 
The fimdamental goal of cryptography is to address the confidential-
ity, data integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation in information 
security. Confidentiality is a services used to keep the content of in-
formation from all but those authorized to have it. Data integrity is 
a service, which addresses the unauthorized alteration of data. Au-
thentication is a service related to identification. Non-repudiation is 
a service, which prevents an entity from denying previous comments 
or actions. These services can be used to prevent and detect cheat-
ing and other malicious activities [54]. In the following subsections, we 
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will present some popular cryptographic techniques, like symmetric-key 
encryption, asymmetric-key encryption, digital signatures, and digital 
certificates. 
2.3.2 Symmetric-key encryption 
Symmetric key encryption involves using a single key to encrypt and 
decrypt data. A plain text message can be encrypted using a shared 
key to generate the cipher text. The plain text message can be received 
by decryption the cipher text with the same key. It should be noted 
that the key for encryption and decryption are the same in symmetric 
key encryption. Generally speaking, symmetric key encryption is fast 
and secure. However, the shared key must be distributed over a secure 
communication channel. The problem is that the physical medium 
you're sending the packets across is insecure. If it were secure, there 
would be no reason to encrypt the message in the first place. Anyone 
who might be monitoring the network could steal the encrypted packets 
and the key necessary for decrypting them. 
2.3.3 Asymmetric-key encryption 
Asymmetric-key encryption also called as public key encryption. Unlike 
asyrnrnetric encryption schemes that involved parties share a common 
encryption or decryption key, public key encryption depends on tow 
different but mathematically related keys. The two different keys are a 
public key that's sent along with the message and a private key that is 
always in the possession of the recipient. The private key is based on a 
derivative of the public key and only the two keys working together can 
decrypt the packets. The public key encryption is more secure because 
it only requires an authenticated channel as opposed to a secure channel 
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that is required for the distribution of symmetric encryption keys. The 
down side of public key encryption is that it tends to be very slow and 
resource intensive. This makes it difficult to send large amounts of data 
using public key encryption. It is typically only used to encrypt small 
amount of data, like digital signatures. 
2.3.4 Digital Signatures 
A digital signature is an electronic signature that can be used to au-
thenticate the identity of the sender of a message or the signer of a 
document, and possibly to ensure that the original content of the mes-
sage or document that has been sent is unchanged. Digital signatures 
are easily transportable, cannot be imitated by someone else, and can 
be automatically time-stamped. The purpose of a digital signature 
is to provide a means for an entity to bind its identity to a piece of 
information held by the entity into a tag called a signature. 
2.3.5 Digital Certificates 
Digital certificate is an attacliinerit to an electronic message used for 
security purposes. The most common use of a digital certificate is to 
verify that a user sending a message is who he or she claims to be, and 
to provide the receiver with the means to encode a reply. An individual 
wishing to send an encrypted message applies for a digital certificate 
from a Certificate Authority (CA). The C A issues an encrypted digital 
certificate containing the applicant's public key and a variety of other 
identification information. The C A makes its own public key readily 
available through print publicity or perhaps on the Internet. The re-
cipient of an encrypted message uses the CA's public key to decode the 
digital certificate attached to the message, verifies it as issued by the 
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C A arid then obtains the sender's public key and identification infor-
mation held within the certificate. With this information, the recipient 
can send an encrypted reply. The most widely used standard for digital 
certificates is X.509. 
2.3.6 Certificate Authority 
As mentioned in the previous sub-section, a certificate authority is a 
trusted third-party organization or company that issues digital certifi-
cates used to create digital signatures and public-private key pairs. The 
role of the C A in this process is to guarantee that the individual granted 
the unique certificate is, in fact, who he or she claims to be. Usually, 
this means that the C A has an arrangement with a financial institution, 
such as a credit card company, which provides it with information to 
confirm an individual's claimed identity. CAs are a critical component 
in data security and electronic commerce because they guarantee that 
the two parties exchanging information are really who they claim to 
be. Even though the public-key encryption looks ideal, it is possible 
for an adversary to defeat the system without breaking the encryption 
system. For example, an adversary can impersonates a communication 
by sending an entity an incorrect public key. It can then intercepts en-
crypted messages, decrypts with its private and re-encrypt the message 
with the correct public key of the receiver, and send it. This shows that 
authenticate public keys is necessary even in public-key encryption sys-
tem. A public-key certificate consists of a data part and a signature 
part. The data part consists of the name of an entity, the public key 
corresponding to that entity, validity period, etc. The signature part 
consists of the signature of a trusted third party over the data part. A 
trust third party must take appropriate measures to verify the identity 
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of A and ensure the public key to be certificated actually belongs to 
A in order to create a public-key certificate for A. In order for an en-
tity B to verify the authenticity of the public key of A, B must have 
an authentic copy of the public signature verification function of the 
trust third part. In this way, entity can gain trust in the authenticity 
of another party's public key by acquiring and verifying the certificate 
[54]. 
2.4 Literature Review 
Traditional network authentication solutions rely on physically present, 
trust third-party servers, or called certificate authorities. Popular net-
work authentication architectures include X.509 standard [37] and Ker-
beros [41]. There is some model on hierarchical CAs and C A delega-
tions [60] have been proposed, but it does not address issues like service 
availability and robustness. However, ad hoc network is infrastructure-
less, there is no centralized server for key managements. There is also 
SPKI is a more flexible and less hierarchical security infrastructure so-
lution [23]. However, it is devised primarily for Internet, and does not 
meet the requirements of mobile ad hoc network. 
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) [29, 1] is proposed following a web-of-
trust authentication model, but it is unable to scale beyond a relatively 
small community of trust individuals. Also, the members may be un-
able to reach consensus on who is trusted and who is not, since inde-
pendent "communities of trust webs" may be formed as a by-product. 
Another active research area is security function sharing [63, 39, 33, 28], 
a popular method is using threshold secret sharing [66]. The basic idea 
is distributing the functionality of the centralized C A server among a 
fixed group of servers. Proactive secret sharing is proposed to improve 
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robustness by updating the secret keys periodically [27’ 26’ 30]. 
The paper written by Zhou and Hass [73] proposed the partially 
distributed certificate authority that makes use of a (/c, n) threshold 
scheme to distribute the services of the certificate authority to a set 
of specialized server nodes. Each of these specialized server node can 
generate a partial certificate using their share of certificate signing key. 
A valid certificate can be obtained only be combining k such partial 
certificates. This approach basically assumes there is rich network con-
nectivity among this small group of server nodes. Also, the server 
nodes better to have a multicast address because a client node needs 
to locate any k of the n server nodes for the certificate renewal. It 
may not be true that ad hoc network support multicast traffic, then 
the client node needs to broadcast its request and will generate a large 
amount of network traffic. Similar to the partially distributed CA, 
the fully distributed certificate authority was proposed by Luo and Lu 
[52，47’ 53]. 
The fully distributed certificate authority approach extends the idea 
of the partially distributed approach by distributing the certificate ser-
vices to every nodes and a threshold number (Jc, n) of neighboring nodes 
can collaboratively act as a server to provide certification services for 
other nodes. It minimizes the effort and complexity for mobile nodes 
to locate and contact the service providers in a dynamic multi-hop 
wireless network. However, this approach assumes that there are k 
neighbors of every node, which may not be always true. Our scheme is 
inspired by these proposals, but extends the l-hop neighboring nodes 
taking part in certificate renewal to nodes that farther away, such as 
2-liop or even 3-hop neighbors. However, the monitoring schemes on 
ad hoc networks usually can just detect the misbehavior of their l-hop 
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neighbors, so we make use of the trust level concept for judging a node 
trustable or not by calculating the values on the trust chain. There-
fore, nodes can decide other nodes, which are 2-liop or farther distance 
can be trusted or not. This makes it possible for k nodes, not direct 
neighbors to the requesting node to take part in the certificate renewal. 
It reduces the problem of not enough neighboring nodes for certificate 
renewal. 
Another public key infrastructure service called M O C A (Mobile 
Certificate Authority) was proposed. It employs threshold cryptog-
raphy to distribute the C A functionality over specially selected nodes 
based on the security and the physical characteristic of nodes [70, 69]. 
Other solutions include the self-issued certificates proposed by Hubaux 
et al [36, 15]. It issues certificates by users themselves without the in-
volvenient of any certificate authority. In this algorithm, each user can 
build its own local certificate repositories for storing the certificates 
that they have issued. Any pair of users can find certificate chains to 
each other using only their certificate repositories. This solution does 
not require any form of infrastructure, but it lacks a certificate revo-
cation mechanism. Also, it has problems if the number of certificates 
issued did not reach certain amount because it is possible that a trust 
chain does not exist. 
Apart from public-key encryption system, distributed key manage-
ment system based on symmetric encryption is also proposed [9]. This 
solution is suitable for nodes with low performance that are unable to 
perform public key encryption. The solution proposed by Balfanz et al 
.7] presents a mechanism for bootstrapping trust relationship in local 
ad hoc networks where the network nodes have no prior relationship 
with each other. However, it requires the nodes to be in short distance 
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during the bootstrapping phase, so it is unsuitable for distributed ad 
hoc networks. The paper from Asokan and Ginborg [6] describes a pass-
word authenticated group key agreement protocol that is an extension 
to the Hypercube protocol. It considers a collaborative network where 
a group of people wish to set up a secure wireless network during a 
meeting. It assume that a password can be chosen and shared within 
the room, then this password can be used in the password authenti-
cated hypercube protocol for sharing a strong secret. However, this 
protocol assumes the participating nodes are arranged in hypercube 
and it is only suitable for very small ad hoc networks. Another paper 
34] overviews several existing Diffie-Hellman based protocols for group 
key establishment. It found that none of these protocols were found 
suitable for all types of ad-hoc networks mainly because they demand 
the network topology to follow a predestined structure. 
Some related security solutions for mobile ad hoc networks also 
include system imprinting, tamper resistance, intrusion detection, mit-
igation of routing misbehavior. System imprinting is done at node ini-
tialization to make a devices know who is its master. A paper presents 
the resurrecting duckling security policy model [64]，which describes se-
cure transient association of a device with multiple serialized owners. A 
number of papers proposed mechanisms on detecting the misbehavior of 
nodes. A paper develops a viable intrusion detection system for wireless 
ad-hoc networks. It proposed that each node is responsible for detect-
ing signs of intrusion locally an independently, but neighboring nodes 
can collaboratively investigate in a broader range [50]. Another paper 
presented that trust relationships and routing decisions are made based 
on experienced, observed, or reported routing and fori wing behavior of 
other nodes nodes. It proposed new routing protocol extensions to 
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND STUDY 2 1 
detect and isolate misbehaving nodes, so make it unattractive to deny 
cooperation [11]. A similar paper also proposed to install watchdog and 
pathrater in the network to detect and mitigate routing misbehavior 
48]. A paper proposed the components of C O N F I D A N T , assumed to 
be present in every node. C O N F I D A N T consists of the components, 
which are the monitor, the reputation system, the path manager, and 
the trust manager [12]. The self-organized feature of the solution is 
provided through fully localized design. The proposed security solu-
tion composes of four components. They are the neighbor verification, 
security enhanced routing protocol, neighbor monitoring, and intru-
sion reaction [67]. The papers from Peitro Michiardi and Rdfik Molva 
pointed out three possible roles that nodes can assume: the requestor, 
the provider and the peer role. It proposed a security mechanism that 
solves the problems due to misbehaving nodes. It incorporates a rep-
utation mechanism that provides an automatic method for the social 
mechanisms of reputation [56, 55 . 
Recently, there are a number of secure routing protocols proposed. 
Most of them are built on the existing routing protocols in mobile ad 
hoc networks, such as the DSDV, D S R and the A O D V protocols. A 
paper proposed a protocol that can be applied to several existing rout-
ing protocols. It presented a route discovery protocol that mitigates 
the detrimental effects of malicious behavior, as to provide correct con-
nectivity information [59]. To deal with external attacks, standard 
schemes such as digital signatures to protect information authentic-
ity and integrity have been considered. The use of a keyed one-way 
hash function with a windowed sequence number for data integrity in 
point-to-point communication and the use of digital signature to pro-
tect messages sent to multiple destinations was proposed [73]. A paper 
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proposed a protocol called Ariadne. Ariadne was built on D S R and 
TESLA, and relies on efficient symmetric cryptography. It prevents 
attackers or compromised nodes from tampering with uncompromising 
routes consisting of uncompromising nodes, and also prevents a large 
number of types of Denial-of-Service attacks [42]. Another paper pro-
posed S E A D as a secure ad hoc network routing protocol based on the 
design of the Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector routing protocol 
(DSDV). In order to support use with nodes of limited C P U process-
ing capability, and to guard against Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks in 
which an attacker attempts to cause other nodes to consume excess net-
work bandwidth or processing time, S E A D uses efficient one-way hash 
functions and do not use asymmetric cryptographic operations in the 
protocol. This protocol can be used with any suitable authentication 
arid key distribution schemes, but it is not straightforward [35]. One 
more paper looks at A O D V in detail and develops a security mechanism 
to protect its routing information. In this paper, it assumes that there 
is a key management sub-system that makes it possible for each ad hoc 
node to obtain public keys from the other nodes of the network. Fur-
ther, each ad hoc node is capable of securely verifying the association 
between the identity of a given ad hoc node and the public key of that 
node [44]. A survey paper gives an overview of potential vulnerability 
and requirement of ad-hoc network, and the proposed prevention, de-
tection and reaction mechanisms for cooperative routing and thwarting 
attacks [71 . 
• E n d of chapter. 
Chapter 3 
Related W o r k 
111 this thesis, we suggest an authentication service that is different 
from the above protocols. The public key authentication service we 
propose involves a well-defined trust model and network model. It fol-
lows the "web of trust" model proposed in P G P [29] with our own 
contribution. In addition, it adopts a clustering-based network model 
in the meantime. One class of existing clustering algorithm in wireless 
ad hoc network is based on independent dominating sets of graphs. 
Weighted based clustering algorithms, on the other hand, are pro-
posed in [31]. These algorithms define a vertex with optimal weight 
within its neighborhood is a cluster head, and the neighborhood of a 
clusterhead is a cluster. The above definitions are used as they agree 
with the network model of our authentication service. In our model, 
the network is divided into several clusters. Each cluster involves a 
clusterhead and its neighborhoods. The clusterhead is responsible for 
managing the join and leave of the cluster members, and the merge 
and division with other clusters. The weight idea is generalized in [8. 
such that any meaningful parameter can be used as the weight to best 
exploit the network properties. Recent work is also performed on clus-
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ter formation such that a node is either a clusterliead or is at most d 
hops away from a clusterhead [5]. Weakly-connected dominating set 
is proposed for clustering ad hoc networks in [17]. A zonal algorithm 
for clustering ad hoc networks is proposed in [18] to divide the net-
work into different regions and make adjustments along the borders 
of the regions to produce a weakly-connected dominating set of the 
entire graph. Moreover, a Group-based Distance Measurement Ser-
vice (GDMS) is also proposed. Nodes in G D M S are self-organized into 
Measurement Groups (Mgroups) to form a hierarchical structure. A 
set of algorithms is proposed to handle network dynamics and optimize 
the group organization [51]. Another paper surveys several clustering 
algorithms based on graph domination [19]. It also describes results 
that show building clustered hierarchies is affordable and clustering 
algorithms can be used to build virtual backbones. 
Regarding to the authentication in ad hoc network, it generally de-
pends on a trust chain formed by trusted intermediaries. To evaluate 
the trusts from the recommendation of other reliable entities, the re-
lying node needs to estimate their trustworthiness. It is a well-known 
technique for authenticating entities in a large-scale system. Some work 
has extended this technique to include multiple paths to strengthen au-
thentication, but it has to handle intersecting paths, ambiguities in the 
meaning of certificates, and interdependencies in the use of different 
keys. A paper develop a set of guiding principles for the design of a 
satisfactory metric of authentication [61]. Different metrics have been 
proposed to evaluate the confidence afforded by the paths. A paper pro-
posed a metric that represents a set of trust relationship by a directed 
graph [10]. It introduces the semantics of direct trust values differ from 
that of recommendation trust values. It shows that different values can 
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be combined to a single value by considering the opinions from the re-
spective recommending entities. Tlie metric in P G P has three levels 
of trust, including the Complete trust, Marginal trust, and Notrust 
[74]. This approach requires one Completely trusted signature or two 
Marginally trusted signature to established a key as valid [65]. Another 
paper explores the use of multiple paths to redundantly authenticate 
a channel and focuses on two notions of path independence. They are 
the disjoint paths and connective paths that seem to increase assur-
ance in the authentication [62]. Besides, a trust management method 
is proposed in [4] to address the problem of reputation-based trust 
management. It allows assessing trust by computing an agents reputa-
tion from its former interactions with other agents and manage data in 
decentralized way with P-Grid [3]. Moreover, a paper presents a dis-
tributed and secure method to compute global trust values, based on 
Power iteration. This algorithm improve the reputation management 
in P2P networks [43]. The distributed trust model is proposed based 
on recommendations [2]. In this model, discrete levels of trust are used 
and it develops an algorithm for calculating trust and using values in 
recommendations. Furthermore, a distributed scheme for trust infer-
ence in peer-to-peer networks. It describes a technique for efficiently 
storing user reputation information in a completely decentralized man-
ner, and show how this information can be used to efficiently identify 
non-cooperative users [49]. Finally, a paper solves the problem of users 
who claim multiple, false identities, or who possess multiple keys, and 
whose that conflicting certificate information can be exploited to im-
prove trustworthiness [40]. 
• E n d of chapter. 
Chapter 4 
Architecture and Models 
In this section, we describe the architecture, network model, and trust 
model of the authentication service we propose for wireless ad hoc 
network. 
4.1 Architecture of the Authentication Service 
The authentication service we propose aims at providing secure public 
key certification despite the presence of malicious nodes in the net-
work. Malicious nodes in authentication may issue false certificates to 
the others. To deal with the problem, we propose a novel authentica-
tion service which is clustering- and trust-based. The reason is that 
the clustering-based network model gives advantages on the behavior 
monitoring among the nodes. The monitoring power of the nodes in 
wireless mobile ad hoc network is usually limited to its neighboring 
nodes, so nodes in the same cluster have relatively higher monitor-
ing power with their short distances. With this feature, we assume 
that any node can monitor and obtain public keys of the nodes in the 
same group accurately unless they are compromised in a sudden attack. 
Apart from the clustering model, we define trust value as an authenti-
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cation metric for indicating the assurance with which a requesting node 
s can obtain the correct public key of a target node t. The chance for 
obtaining a correct public key certification increases if the node sign-
ing the certificate with high trusts value. Simply a clustering model 
and trust value are not enough in prohibiting dishonest users because 
a node with high trust value can still be malicious suddenly when it is 
attacked. Therefore, we design each public key request on new node 
with multiple replies, so that conclusion can be made with the major-
ity votes. This operation improves the security for obtaining a correct 
public key and helps to discover dishonest user in the network. Trust 
value of the dishonest user will be reduced, so malicious nodes will be 
isolated in our authentication service. 
Figure 4.1 shows the architecture of our authentication service. 
There are totally 4 layers in this architecture, including the mobile 
hosts, network model, trust model, and the security operations. Wire-
less ad hoc network contains large amount of mobile hosts, each with 
a transmission range that is small relative to the network size. W e 
divide the network into different region and nodes in the same region 
form a cluster. A cluster, or we call a group, is a connected sub-network 
usually with a smaller diameter. W e define two kinds of trust relation-
ship in the clustered network, including the trust relationship of two 
nodes within the same group and the trust relationship of two nodes 
ill different groups. The security operations are performed on top of 
the lower layers. These operations include public key certification and 
trust value update, which will be presented in Section 4. 
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Cluster Ckister Cluster Cluster Network Model 
Nodes Mobile Hosts 
Figure 4.1: Architecture of Our Authentication Service 
4.2 The Network Model 
Since a wireless ad hoc network is an infrastructureless network that 
requires only mobile units to form the network, it can involve a large 
number of mobile units and each with a short transmission range. An 
important feature in wireless ad hoc networks is multi-liopping, which 
is the ability of the mobile units to relay packets through radios from 
one another without the use of base stations. Obtaining a hierarchical 
organization has been proven effective in minimizing the amount of 
storage for communication information, and in optimizing the use of 
network bandwidth. 
Apart from the view of efficiency, we believe clustering improves 
the security of a network. Since wireless ad hoc network lacks of a 
centralized server for management, security measure relies on individ-
ual nodes to monitor each other. However, the monitoring capability 
of a node is normally limited to its neighboring nodes. On the other 
hand, nodes clustering together allow the monitoring work to proceed 
more naturally, so as to improve the overall network security. In this 
thesis, we propose an authentication service in wireless ad hoc network 
by trust management and clustering techniques. 
A number of existing solutions have been proposed for clustering 
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in wireless ad hoc networks. In our design, we divide the network into 
different regions with similar number of hosts in each of them like in 
Figure 4.2. Nodes clustering together in the same region form a group 
and are assigned with a unique group ID. The group ID is assigned 
to be the cluster head ID in this thesis. However, it is also possible 
for the clusterhead to suggest a group ID which is agreed by its group 
member. W e adopt the zonal algorithm for clustering ad hoc network 
[18] in our network model. The zonal distributed algorithm partitions 
the network into different regions by an asynchronous distributed al-
gorithm for finding minimum spanning tree (MST). It is assumed that 
the M S T algorithm can finish before the nodes being moved around. 
The execution of the M S T algorithm terminates when the size of com-
ponents in the tree reaches a value x, which is the maximum group size 
in our network model. Once the network is divided into regions and 
a spanning tree has been determined for each region. It computes the 
weakly connected dominating sets of the regions. Finally, it fixes the 
borders of different regions by including some additional nodes from 
the borders of the regions. W e assume that nodes in the network can 
know the group, which another belongs to by exchanging messages. 
Our work aims at generating the clusters with similar sizes. There 
is a clusterhead in each cluster for management purpose. Similar sizes 
among the clusters balance the workload of the cluster heads. It also 
avoids the existence of small cluster that may not have enough members 
to provide public key certificates for new nodes. A node in the network 
is either a clusterhead or at most d' hops away from the clusterhead. 
Due to the mobile nature in ad hoc networks, nodes can join, leave, 
and move in the network freely. The clustering algorithm should be able 
to adapt to the dynamic network topology. Most of the existing pa-
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Figure 4.2: The Network Model 
pers on clustering focus on the algorithm to create a cluster structures 
when it is invoked. They are not handling node dynamics after the 
cluster structures are formed [18]. Some of the current work assumes 
the network topology remains unchanged throughout the execution of 
the clustering algorithm [24]. Some of them did not determine the 
appropriate time to trigger the clustering algorithm [5]. 
Although re-clustering the entire network is possible, we have to de-
termine the appropriate time to invoke the clustering algorithm. The 
clustering algorithm can be run either at regular intervals, or whenever 
the network configuration changes. If re-clustering is carried out on 
each node-entry or exit, it overloads the network with many clustering 
messages. The network can hardly be stabilized if the entry and exit 
of nodes are too frequent. Another approach is invoking the clustering 
algorithm periodically, but it is hard to determine how long it should 
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be between two invocations. Moreover, the invocation of the clustering 
algorithni brings many clustering messages and consumes the compu-
tation time and power of the nodes. Handling the node dynamics with 
appropriate maintaining scheme is important to reduce the network 
load. 
4.2.1 Clustering-Based Structure 
Mobile ad hoc network is a collection of mobile nodes with wireless 
coiiiniuiiication. Before building the clustering structures, we assume 
that a collection of nodes already exist in the network. To build the 
clustering-based structures, the clustering algorithm is invoked. W e 
adopt the Max-Min D-Cluster Formation approach [33] with several 
modifications to form the clusters. It ensures a node is either a cliis-
teliead or at most d hops away from a clusterhead. Max-Min runs 
asynchronously eliminating the need and overhead of highly synchro-
nized clocks. The nurnber of messages is a multiple of d rounds. The 
iiiain difference between our approach and the original Max-Min ap-
proach is that we use the trust value, instead of node ID, as the major 
factor ill clustering. In the original approach, node IDs are compared 
ill the Floodinax and Floodrnin steps, such that the node with the 
largest node ID among its members becomes the clusterhead. In our 
approach, nodes are able to rate the level of trust of its neighboring 
nodes and store their trust values. The Floodinax and Floodrnin steps 
compare the trust values among the nodes, such that nodes with higher 
trust value will have higher probability to become clusterheads. If two 
nodes are having same trust value in the process of Floodinax, the node 
with higher node ID will be propagated. The Floodinax and Floodrnin 
each runs for d rounds. Each node maintains a winning pair (i, ID) for 
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information exchange. The value t and ID in the winning pair repre-
sents the trust value and the ID of the winning node of a particular 
round. 
Our algorithm works as follow: 
1. Each node i obtain their trust values tj’i from its neighboring nodes 
j. Then, node i calculate its trust value by averaging the values tj’i 




Each node initializes the winning pair to be its trust value and node 
ID, 
2. Each node broadcasts its winning pair {t, ID) to its 1-hop neigh-
bors. After all neighboring nodes have been heard from, for a single 
round, the node chooses the pair with largest trust value as the new 
winning pair. If there are more than one pairs of value having equal 
highest trust value, the pair with highest node ID will be selected. 
This FloodMax mechanism lasts for d rounds. 
3. The FloodMin is similar to FloodMax, but each node chooses the 
pair with smallest trust value as the new winning pair. This FloodMin 
mechanism also lasts for d rounds. 
4. Nodes who received its own node ID in the floodmin stage de-
clare itself a clusterhead. Other nodes join the clusterliead whose node 
id occurs at least once as a winning pair in both the Floodmax and 
Floodmin rounds of flooding. 
The cluster formation has four logical stages: Firstly, each node 
collects its trust values from the view of its neighboring nodes and 
calculates its trust value. Secondly, the FloodMax runs for d rounds. 
Thirdly, the FloodMin runs for another d rounds. Finally, nodes are 
selected as clusterheads or join the corresponding clusters as members. 
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This algorithm relies on individual node to calculate its trust value 
based on the information from its neighbors. Malicious node is able to 
broadcast its trust and id pair with an incorrect trust value. To make 
the mechanism more secure, a node can broadcast the trust values to 
its neighboring nodes to its 2-liop neighbors. This allows a node to 
collect more information on the trust values of its neighboring nodes. 
When it receives the 1st FloodMax message from its neighbor, it can 
use the trust values from the view of itself and some other nodes to 
estimate the correctness of that FloodMax message. 
4.2.2 Clusterhead Selection Criteria and Role 
Clusterhead selection criteria are related to the levels of trust among 
the nodes. Each of the nodes gives trust value to each of its neigh-
boring nodes in terms of its view. Normally, this value is based on its 
observation and past experience from one to another. The view of a 
node is independent to that of another. Different nodes may not have 
the same trust value to the same node. To sum up the views from 
all neighboring nodes to a specific node, trust values from neighboring 
nodes are normalized and averaged to get the resulting trust value. 
A clusterhead coordinates the activities in its cluster. It also stores 
the list of members and keeps exchanging information with other clus-
terhead. The clusterhead maintains the number of members /c to a 
defined level, where S < k < L. When k〉L、the clusterhead invoke 
the division of the cluster. When k < S, the clusterhead invoke the 
merging of it with another cluster. If the clusterhead leaves the cur-
rent cluster, it will invoke the re-selection of clusterhead. It will pass 
the member list to the new clusterhead for cluster management. Since 
the authentication protocol proposed in this report requires informa-
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tion exchange among the clusters, each clusterhead has to maintain 
its member list and pass the information to the clusterhead of other 
clusters for updating. 
Network Maintenance 
As mentioned in the above paragraphs, invocation of the clustering al-
gorithm leads to messages that overload the network. W e try to reduce 
the frequency for running the clustering algorithm by introducing some 
network management techniques. With proper network management, a 
node can leave from the current cluster and join a new cluster automat-
ically. This avoids the invocation of the clustering algorithm in every 
change of network topology. The merge and division can maintain the 
size of cluster within an acceptable level. Re-selection of clusterhead is 
necessary when the clusterhead is leaving the cluster or is found to be 
not trust-worthy anymore. Although network maintenance reduces the 
invocation of cluster algorithm, it is still necessary to run the algorithm 
at certain moment. 
Move to a New Cluster 
A clusterhead is responsible for the management of the cluster. It peri-
odically broadcasts "hello" messages for d hops, so all cluster members 
received the messages. Members will then reply to the clusterhead to 
confirm their existence in the cluster. If the clusterhead does not re-
ceive any reply from a member, it indicates that that cluster member 
is no longer in the cluster. It will then update its member list. 
When a cluster member moves from one cluster to another, it may 
not know its leaving from the original cluster unless it does not receives 
the "hello" message from the original clusterhead for a period of time. 
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If this is the case, the node has to join a new cluster. If it receives 
"hello" message from a new cluster, then it will know which its new 
cluster. Otherwise, it has to ask its new neighbors for their cluster-
head. Then, it should send a "join" message to the new cluster head. 
The clusterheads in the network exchange their lists of memberships 
periodically, so they keep update about the members each cluster. This 
information is important for selecting introducing nodes in our trust-
and clustering-based authentication protocol. 
Cluster Merge and Division 
When the number of nodes in a cluster A becomes too small, it can 
merge with one of its neighboring clusters. A clusterhead who main-
tains the member list will discover the decrease on the number of mem-
bers, k. If k is smaller then the threshold S, it will check the mem-
ber lists of its neighboring clusters. It selects a neighboring cluster B 
with smallest number of members, k' to consider the possibility on the 
merge. If {k + k') < L, it will prepare for the merge. To complete the 
merge, the clusterhead of cluster A sends a "request merge" message 
to the clusterhead of cluster B. If clusterhead of cluster B agrees for 
the merge, the clusterhead of cluster A will send it the member list in 
cluster A. Clusterhead of cluster B will then update its member list by 
including the member list of cluster A. Clusterhead of cluster A will 
also broadcast the new cluster ID to the members in its old clusters. 
After that, the original clusterhead and members of cluster A will join 
cluster B. 
Similarly, when the number of nodes in a cluster A becomes too 
large, it can be divided into two clusters. If clusterhead of cluster A 
finds the number of members /c > L, it will prepare for the division. In 
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this case, the clusterhead will broadcast a "division request" message 
to all its members. Members who receive the request message will reply 
to the clusterhead. With this mechanism, the clusterhead can find out 
the number of hops between itself and each member. After collecting 
this information, it selects one of the cluster members with maximum 
hops away from itself to be the clusterhead of the newly created cluster. 
Then, the cluster members decide to join the nearest clusterhead among 
the two and send "join" message to the corresponding clusterhead. 
After that, the two clusterheads update their member lists. 
Clusterhead Re-selection 
Since the clusterhead may move to other clusters or leave the network, 
the re-selection of clusterhead is necessary in some cases. If a clus-
terhead knows it would soon leave the cluster or the network, it can 
invoke the process for re-selection of clusterhead before its leave. In 
this case, the clusterhead can select a neighboring node with highest 
trust value to be the new clusterhead. It will then pass the member list 
to the new clusterhead and inform its members on the result of cluster-
head reselection. In some cases, the clusterhead is unable to invoke the 
reselection of clusterhead, for example, a clusterhead does not notice 
it has already leave the original cluster while moving, or it is found 
to be malicious. If this is the case, the node who firstly discovers the 
leave of the clusterhead invokes the re-selection of clusterhead. In the 
re-selection of clusterhead, members agree on a new clusterhead with 
the highest trust values or node ID. 
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Network re-clustering 
Each clusterhead maintains the list of members and their distances to 
the clusterhead. The number of hops from a member to the cluster-
head is at most D hops. With the dynamic nature of the network and 
the following network operations, the distance from a member to clus-
terhead d may become greater than D. W e define Dt as the threshold 
on the number of hops that may lead to malformation of the network 
cluster, where Dt > d. A clusterhead records the number of nodes 
whose d > Dt and distribute this information to other clusterhead. If 
the number of these cases is higher than the threshold M , then the 
clustering algorithm will be invoked by any of the clusterhead. Then, 
the clustering algorithm will be invoked, which is as same as the cluster 
formation algorithm at the initialization of the network. 
4.3 T h e Trust Model 
Authentication in a network usually requires participation of trusted 
entities. Wireless ad hoc network has no centralized server for trust 
and key management. W e define a fully distributed trust management 
algorithm to maintain network security. In our trust model, any user 
can act as a certifying authority. Any node can sign public key certifi-
cate of another node in the same group upon request. As mentioned 
before, we assume a node is able to obtain and store the correct public 
keys of the same group. Also, a node can observe and give trust value 
to each of its group members by some monitoring components. W e 
define a trust value as an authentication metric, which represents the 
assurance with which a requesting node s can obtain the correct public 
key of a target t. W e adopts the fully distributed trust management 
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approach, such that each node has a trust table for storing the trust 
values and public keys of the nodes that they know. 
In our authentication service, when a node s wants to obtain the 
public key of another node t. It checks which group node t belongs to. 
Then, it looks up its trust table to find the first k nodes that belong 
to the group of node t and with the highest trust values. Node s then 
selects these k nodes as introducers and sends them request messages on 
the public key of node t. Introducers are the nodes in the same group of 
the target node t and are trusted by the requesting node s. To evaluate 
the trusts from the recommendation of other reliable entities, relying 
node should be able to estimate their trustworthiness. Many metrics 
have been proposed to evaluate the confidence afforded by different 
paths. In our trust model, we define the authentication metric as a 
continuous value between 0.0 and 1.0. This authentication metric, or 
we call trust value is assigned and stored by a node to another in a 
subjective and localized way. A trust value V^j represents the level of 
trust from node i to node j. The higher the value represents the more 
node i trusts node j, and vice versa. 
This particular trust model is selected as it allows a distributed 
management of trust in the network. This property accommodate to 
the self-organized and fully-distributed nature of mobile ad hoc net-
works. The authentication metrics formalizes the security levels of the 
nodes and allow the exchange of trust information among the nodes. 
The ideas of trust chains and multiple paths will be presented in the 
following paragraph. Normally, a node is able to observe and directly 
communicate with its neighboring nodes. Trust-worthy intermediate 
nodes on a trust path allow a node to obtain the trust information 
of farther away nodes by its multi-hop nature. The usage of multiple 
CHAPTER 4. ARCHITECTURE AND MODELS 3 9 
paths reduce the harms from the incorrect information provided by 
malicious nodes. 
The network model and trust model have certain dependency to 
each other. In order to determine a good cluster size, the architecture 
design has to take into account for enough number of introducers and 
secure results. The network size should not be too small, so it guar-
antees a requesting node can find enough introducers for public key-
certification. However, it should not be too large due to the difficulties 
in managing a large cluster. Managing a large cluster may overload 
its clusterhead. Also, the monitoring capability and the transmission 
range is relatively small in mobile ad hoc network, so it is hard to pro-
vide security in a large cluster involving a lot of nodes and many hops 
in communications. 
Regarding to our network model, we present two types of trust rela-
tionships, including the direct trust relationship and recommendation 
trust relationship as shown in Figure 4.3. The direct trust relationship 
is the trust relationship between two nodes in the same group, while the 
recommendation trust is the trust relationship between nodes of dif-
ferent groups. W e apply the formulae for combination of values from 
the direct trust and recommendation trust approach [10]. Prom [10], 
direct trust means to trust an entity directly means to believe in its ca-
pabilities with respect to the given trust class. Recommendation trust 
expresses the belief in the capability of an entity to decide whether an-
other entity is reliable in the given trust class and in its honesty when 
recommending third entities. 
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Figure 4.3: The Trust Model 
4 . 3 . 1 Direct Trust 
P ^ Q 
A direct trust relationship exists if all trust experiences with Q which 
P knows about are positive experience. It is a value of the trust rela-
tionship which is an estimation of the probability that Q behaves well 
when being trusted (and is based on the number of positive experiences 
with Q which P knows about. The value Vd of these experiences can 
be computed by: 
卯 = (4.1) 
where p is the number of positive experiences which P knows about Q. 
It is the probability that Q has a reliability of more than a, found on 
the information P possesses about Q. The reliability is the probability 
that Q turns out to be reliable when being entrusted with a single 
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task, a should be chosen reasonably high to ensure sufficiently safe 
estimations. 
4.3.2 Recommendation Trust 
P 、 Q 
A recommendation trust relationship exists if P is willing to accept 
reports from Q about experiences with third parties with respect to 
trust. It represents the portion of offered experiences that P is willing 
to accept from Q and is based on the experiences P has had with the 
entities recommended by Q. The recommendation trust value v,. can 
be computed by: 
f 
Vr = (4.2) 
0 else 
\ 
The nuiiibers of positive and negative experiences are represented by p 
and n, respectively. This value can be regarded as a degree of similarity 
between P and Q, taking into account that different entities may have 
different experiences with a third party. 
4.3.3 Deriving Direct Trust 
The first formula computes the trust relationship: 
V i Q V 2 = l - ( l - V 2 f ' (4.3) 
This formula can be used to calculate value of the new recommendation 
path. It is a result of the computation of the direct trust values and the 
semantics of the recommendation values. If V2 is based on p positive 
experiences, the following equation holds: 
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〇 = 1 - (1 - (1 - a P )广 = 1 - aVi.P (4.4) 
Thus, it is equivalent of having "p . experiences. 
In our model, a new recommendation path involve a reconinienda-
tion trust relationship between a relying node and an introducer, and a 
direct trust relationship between an introducer and a new node. Based 
oil the above relationships, the formula is appropriate for our occasion. 
Combination of Direct Trust 
Another formula combines values of direct trust relationships: 
= i — n£i(n 二 1(1 一T/。.))i (4.5) 
This formula is used for drawing a consistent conclusion when there 
are several derived trust relationships of same trust class between two 
entities. This can be applied in our model as well. It is because a 
relying node asks for multiple introducers, instead of one for signing 
public key certificates of a new node. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 5 
Trust- and Clustering-Based 
Authentication Service 
This chapter covers the details of the trust- and clustering-based au-
thentication service proposed. It includes the description of the cluster-
ing structure formation and maintenance and the security operations 
provided by the authentication service. 
5.1 Clustering Structure Formation and Mainte-
nance 
In this section, it discusses how the clustering structure is formed when 
a collection of mobile nodes are present on a flat surface without any 
infrastructure. Then, it explains how to adapts to the mobile nature 
of nodes and keep a balance clustering structure in the network. 
5.1.1 Clustering Structure Formation 
When a mobile ad hoc network forms, there is only a collection of 
nodes without any infrastructure. The clustering structure formation 
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algorithm is then run, so that the network will be divided into several 
clusters. The clustering structure is a logical structure which provides 
the basic enviromnerit for our trust model and authentication service. 
It supports two kinds of trust relationships, including the intra-group 
trust relationship and inter-group trust relationship. The clustering 
structure is adopted as we believe that nodes in the same clustering 
can build up stronger trust relationship with the direct monitoring 
power among the neighboring nodes in mobile ad hoc network. 
W e adopt the Max-Min D-Cluster Formation algorithm with some 
modifications. In the original approach, clusters are formed by diffusing 
only the node ID along the wireless links. When the heuristic termi-
nates, a node either becomes a clusterhead, or is at most d wireless 
hops away from its clusterhead. Nodes with higher node ID usually 
have higher chance to be the clusterheads. However, node ID actually 
does not give special meaning in protecting the network security, so 
we decide to use trust value, instead of node ID, to be the criteria in 
cluster formation. In our approach, clusters are formed by diffusing 
not only the node ID, but also the trust value of itself. The cluster-
heads are usually found to have high value in comparing with its cluster 
members. 
Algorithm 1 shows the clustering formation algorithm we use in 
our authentication service. First, the trust value of a node is obtained 
from its neighboring nodes. Each node will broadcast a request to its 
neighboring nodes, its neighbors will then reply with the trust value of 
the requesting node. After collecting all the replies, a node calculates 
its trust value by averaging the received values. Then, each of the 
node initialize a winning pair < WINNERJD^ WINNERTRUST > as 
its node ID and trust value. After that, the FloodMax algorithm is 
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run for d rounds. In each round, each node broadcasts its winning pari 
to its neighboring nodes. After they have received the messages, each 
of therii chooses the pair with highest trust value as its own winning 
pair. In the case with same trust values received in the same round, the 
pair with higher ID will be selected as the winning pair. This process 
repeats for d rounds. The Floodmin algorithm follows the FloodMax 
for another d rounds. It is similar to the FloodMax algorithm unless a 
node chooses the smallest trust value instead of the largest value as the 
winning pair. Finally, nodes can determine the clusterlieads when the 
Floodmin completes. A node declares itself as cluterliead if its node 
ID is as same as the WINNERJD in its winning pair. Otherwise, it 
identifies all the node pairs in the MaxMin algoithm and selects the 
pair with minimuni trust value to be the clusterhead and join it. If it 
still cannot select a clusterhead, it join the cluster with the maximum 
trust value in the 1st d rounds of flooding as its clusterhead. A node 
sends message to its clusterhead to indicate its joining of the cluster. 
5 . 1 . 2 Network Maintenance 
The clusters formed by the clustering formation algorithm are not in 
balance sizes. The number of nodes in each cluster is not similar to 
each other. In our trust- and clustering-based authentication service, 
however, a balance clustering structure benefits to the performance and 
the security of the network. With similar number of members in the 
clusters, the clusterlieads share almost the same workload to maintain 
their own clusters. Also, it balance the intra-cluster trust relationship 
and inter-cluster trust relationship among the nodes in the network. It 
avoids nodes with too great size, such that nodes in the same clusters 
do not gain from the neighboring monitoring power due to the large 
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Algorithm 1 Clustering structure formation 
for each node n do 
Obtain trust values tneighbork’n from its neighboring nodes neighbor^, 
where /c = 1’...，iV: 
^n ^ ^ neighborh :{Vn.REQTRUSr)-, 
'^neighboTk ^ "^n '• {'^neighbor^) f^ ni ineighbork,n) i 
Calculates its trust value by averaging the values tneighbork,n received: 
t孔 _ Ylk^l ^ n e i g h b o r ( 5 丄） 
Initializes the winning pair {WINNERTRUST, WINNERW) to be its 
trust value TN and node ID; 
end for 
for each node n do 
Broadcasts its winning pair {WINNERID, WINNERTRUST) to its 
1-hop neighbors for d-roimds in this Floodmax mechanism: 
for 2 = 1 to d do 
t^i 么 Vneighbor, ： K , WINNERJD, WINNERTRUST)-, 
'^iieighbori^ ^ Vn : {Vneighbor^WINNERiD, WIN N ERTRUST)', 




for each node n do 
Broadcasts its winning pair {WINNER^, WINNERTRUST) to its 
1-hop neighbors for d-rounds in this Floodmin mechanism: 
for 2 = 1 to d do 
Vn 么 Vneighbov, ： K , W I N N E R w , WINNERTRUST) 
• {VNAI9HBOR,.WINNERID, WINNERTRUST)-, 




for each node n do 
if WINNERID == ID then 
Declares itself as a clusterhead; 
else 
Identifies all node pairs and selects the node pairs with minimum 
trust value as its clusterhead; 
else 
Selects the node with maximum trust value in the 1st d rounds of 
flooding its clusterhead; 
end if 
end for 
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distances. Furthermore, it prevents the cluster with the target node 
from not providing enough number of introducing nodes. 
Apart from the imbalance structure after the clustering formation, 
actually, the mobile nature of host in ad hoc network has to be han-
dled property. Nodes are moving from one location to another in the 
network. They are leaving one cluster and joining to another one fre-
quently in a highly mobile environment. W e have designed three ap-
proach to handle the change of memberships among the clusters. W e 
also consider how they perform in maintaining a balance clustering 
structures. 
Each node requests for the cluster ID of its neighboring nodes peri-
odically to know its neighboring clusters. In each cycle, a node broad-
casts request to its neighboring nodes and collects the replies. In Algo-
rithm 2，a node updates its cluster ID by joining the neighboring cluster 
with miniinum size. This approach can maintain a uniform cluster sizes 
in the network, but the it brings overhead on the frequent change of 
memberships. In Algorithm 3, a node joins the neighboring cluster 
with ininimum size only if it leaves the original cluster. This approach 
effectively reduces the changes of memberships. However, the network 
is found to converge to a one cluster eventually. It may due to the 
imbalance cluster sizes after the cluster formation algorithm was run. 
Ill Algorithm 4, a node joins the neighboring cluster with miriimum 
size only if it leaves the original cluster or the sizes of the neighboring 
clusters are not within certain range. W e defined two parameters S 
and L which represents the rniiiiiimm and maximum cluster size in the 
network. A cluster whose number of nodes is smaller than S or greater 
than L are claimed to be not within a certain range. If any of the 
neighboring cluster is this case, the node will leave its original cluster 
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and join the neighboring cluster with minimum number of nodes even 
it still receives the original clustering ID. This approach was found to 
maintain a balance clustering structure in the network, which is sim-
ilar to the first approach and it leads to less frequent changes in the 
memberships from one cluster to another among the nodes. Since the 
second approach does not provide a balance clustering structure, so we 
can only adopt either approach 1 or approach 3. Consider the number 
of changes in memberships, approach 3 performs better than approach 
1. It is because approach 3 involves fewer changes in membership, so it 
reduces the overhead due to the move. Therefore, we adopt approach 
3 in our authentication service. 
Experiments on three approaches have been conducted and the re-
sults are shown in the section of Simulations and Results. 
Algorithm 2 Clustering Structure Maintaining - Approach 1 
1： for each cycle do 
2: for each node n do 
3: Vn — Vneighbovk : {'^n, REQdusterld)\ 
4: '^neighbork ^ ^n • i '^neighbork i Cluster IDneighbork)\ 
5: miUsize = size of Cluster I Dneighbork\ 
(): 爪几 cZuster = C luster ID neighbor k ； 
7: for V Cluster I Dneighbork do 
8: if minsize < size of Cluster I Dneighbork then 
9: minsize = size of Cluster I Dneighbork', 
1 0 : 饥饥 cluster =Cluster I Dneighbork] 
11： end if 
12: end for 
13： Joins the miriciuster'i 
14： end for 
15： end for 
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Algorithm 3 Clustering Structure Maintaining - Approach 2 
1： for each cycle do 
2: for each node n do 
•J- ”n ~^ '^neighbork :{Un, REQ Cluster I dY, 
4: 幻 neighbork “^ ” ri • {^ni '^neighbor k i Cluster ID neighbor k) i 
5： if Cluster I Dn V Cluster I Dneighbork then 
6: miusize = size of Cluster ID neighbor 
7: TTilTlciiister =c luster ID neighbor k ； 
8： for V Cluster I Dneighbork do 
9: 11 TTllTLsize < size of Cluster I Dneighboru then 
10: miUsize = size of Cluster ID neighbor k ； 
11: trilTlcluster =Cluster I Dneighbork ； 
12： end if 
13： end for 
14： end if 
15： Joins the minduster] 
16： end for 
17： end for 
Algorithm 4 Clustering Structure Maintaining - Approach 3 
1： for each cycle do 
2： for each node n do 
3: Vii ~> '^ neighboTk 
4: '^neighbor^ ^  '^n : x'^td "^neighbor^ ？ C luster I Dneighbork〉； 
5： if C luster I Dn — V Cluster I Dneighbork or 3\{S < 
size of Cluster I Dneighbork < L) then 
6： miUsize = size of Cluster I Dneighbork'^ 
7: TTUTlcluster — 
Cluster I Dneighbork'^ 
8: for V Cluster I Dneighbork do 
9： if miUsize < size of Cluster I Dneighbork then 
10: miUsize = size of Cluster I Dneighbork ； 
11: TTllTlclxister = 
Cluster I Dneighbork', 
12: end if 
13： end for 
14： end if 
15： Joins the minduster] 
16： end for 
17： end for 
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5.2 Security Operations 
The authentication protocol we propose takes a certificate-based ap-
proach [58] [57]. If a user i believes a given key belongs to a given user 
t, it can issue a public key certificate of t. When a node s wants to 
get the public key of a node t, it requests for the public key certificates 
of node t from some trustable nodes. Node s sends request messages 
to some nodes that belong to the group of node t and with high trust 
values in the view of s. These nodes which sign the public key cer-
tificates of node t are called introducers. They reply to the requesting 
node with the public key certificate of the target node and also the 
trust value of the target node. 
The security operations are divided into three parts, including the 
public key certification, identification of malicious nodes and the trust 
value update. Figure 5.1 shows the flow of the major security op-
erations. In public key certification, a node requests the public key 
certificates of the target node, collects and concludes the public key 
of the target node by majority votes. During the comparison among 
the received certificates, identification of malicious nodes can be done. 
Finally, trust values of the target node can be calculated and updated. 
Table 5.1 shows the security operations of a requesting node s. 
When node s wants to obtain the public key of a node t, it selects 
a certain number of nodes that it trusts as introducers. These intro-
ducers should be in the same group of node t, so they can provide the 
public key and trust value of node t accurately. Then, node s sends the 
request of public key certificate to all the selected introducers. After 
node s collects all the replies, it compares the public key certificates 
received and concludes the public key of node t with the majority votes. 
If a malicious introducer providing a false public key certificate of node 
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t is discovered, it will be isolated by reducing its trust value to zero. 
Finally, trust value of node t will be calculated and inserted into the 
trust table of node s. Details operations on public key certification and 
trust value update will be presented in the following subsections. 
It shows the operations of s on obtaining public key certificates of 
t. To request the public key of t, s first looks up the group ID (^t of 
node t. Then, it sorts the trust values that belong to (pt and selects the 
nodes with the highest trust value as introducer ii’ 么2，…，in and sends 
them request messages. After collecting the reply messages encrypted 
with introducers' secret keys, s decrypts the messages with the corre-
sponding public key. Next, it compares the public keys obtained from 
the reply messages and concludes the public key of t as the one with 
majority votes. It reduces the trust values of the nodes which do not 
agree with that public key, so to avoid selecting these dishonest nodes 
as introducers in the future. Finally, s will calculate and update the 
trust value of it, Vt. 
5.2.1 Public K e y Certification 
Authentication in our network relies on the public key certificates 
signed by some trustable nodes. Let s be the node requests for public 
key of a target node t. Node s has to ask for public key certificates 
signed by some introducing nodes, ii, 12, ..., in, as shown in Figure 
5.2. Every node is able to request for public key certificates of any 
other new nodes. However, nodes in the same group are assumed to 
know each other by means of their monitoring components and the 
short distances among them. With the above assumptions, we focus 
on the public key certification where s and t belong to different groups. 
Nodes which are in the same group with t and have already built up 
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Figure 5.1: Security Operations 
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Table 5.1: Operations of Node s in Public Key Certification 
1. Looks up the group ID of t,ipt. 
2. Sorts the trust values of nodes belonging to group cpt in the trust 
table. Let ii, Z2,..., in G where ii, 12,..., in denote nodes with the 
highest trust values in group ipt' ’ 
3. Sends request messages to nodes in I. 
4. Collects the reply messages m e M from ii,�2’...，in, where m = 
{Pkt, Vif^^t, •••}Ski^. Pkt denotes the public key of node t, Vi^^t denotes 
the trust value from to t, and Ski^ denotes the secret key of ik. The 
reply message is signed by the secret key of if., . 
5. Compares the public keys received and concludes with the majority 
votes. Let igood € I good and ibad £ had , where igood are the nodes that 
thought to be honest (agree on Pkt with the majority) and ibad are the 
remaining nodes that thought to be dishonest.  
6. Reduces the trust values of ibad to zero. Computes and updates the 
trust value of t,Vt，with this formulae: 
ys,i.,t = O 乂 = 1 — (1 - Vi^ t)""-'^  (5.2) 
and 
Vt = l-UU{l-Vs,i„t), (5.3) 
where denote the nodes in Igood and n denotes the number of nodes 
in Igood- 
trust relationship with s can be introducers. The requesting node s 
selects certain number of nodes with the highest trust values as intro-
ducers and sends them request messages. The introducers ii, 12 ,..., 
in, after receiving the messages will reply with the public key of the 
target node t. Apart from the public key of t, it includes the trust 
value of t as well. These values from ii, i〗,...,in, will be used for 
calculating the final trust value of t in s when all the reply messages 
are received. The reply message should be signed with the introducers' 
private keys to make the certificate valid. 
Algorithm 5 shows the procedure on the request for public key cer-
tificates of a target node. In this algorithm, node Vi is requesting for the 
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Figure 5.2: Public Key Certification 
public key certificates of node Vj. Given that node Vi belongs to cluster 
C L U S T A and node VJ belongs to cluster CLUSTB- Before sending out 
the request message, node Vi first check wether it is in the same cluster 
with Vj. If it is the case, it send request message to its neighboring 
nodes and it is believed that some of its neighboring nodes should have 
build up direct trust relationship with Vj by themselves or their neigli-
boriiig nodes. After receiving the reply messages, Vi simply updates 
the trust value and public key of Vj. It is because nodes in the same 
cluster are believed to know each other other. They are able to discover 
the malicious nodes in their own cluster, so the neighboring nodes that 
they are coinmuiiicating with are always trust-worthy. On the other 
hand, if Vi and Vj are in different clusters, then the problem become 
more complicated. Node vi has to selects some trust-worthy nodes in 
the target cluster to be the introducing nodes, or so called introducers. 
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These are nodes with high trust values in the view of Vi and in the same 
cluster with Vj. Similar to the previous case, Vi sends the request mes-
sage to the introducers and wait for the replies. However, it is possible 
for the introducers to be malicious and Vi has not yet discovered due 
to the long distance between them. Therefore, a voting will be carried 
out to conclude the correct public key of the target node with majority 
votes. This is the algorithm in making public key certificate requests. 
Algorithm 5 Request for public key certificates 
Given VI belongs to C LUST A and VJ belongs to CLUSTB, A node VI 
requests for the public key certificate of a node Vj： 
if {CLUSTA = = CLUSTB) then 
Vi sends request to neighbors Vk： 
Vi Vk ： {Vi,Vj,REQcERT)； 
”k 4 Vi ： 
Vi updates PKj and Tj; 
else 
VI selects trust-worthy nodes in CLUSTB as introducers IK； 
Vi 么 ik : {vi,Vj,REQcERT)\ 
h — Vi : 
Vi compares the PKj from the received certificates and update PKj in 
their repository; 
Vi calculates and updates Tj.、 
end if 
5.2.2 Identification of Malicious Nodes 
As mentioned before, mobile ad hoc network is a collection of nodes 
connected with wireless communications and it is vulnerable to secu-
rity attacks. Mobile ad hoc network does not provide any centralized 
servers for security or management purposes. The lack of infrastruc-
ture and organizational environment of mobile ad-hoc networks offer 
special opportunities to attackers. To protect the network security, it 
relies on the capability of individual nodes. In a hostile network en-
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virorirnent, there exists a number of malicious nodes in the network. 
These malicious nodes can harm the network by dropping the packets, 
hijacking the communications between the nodes, etc. In terms of our 
public key certification service, a malicious node can reply a public key 
certificate request with an incorrect public key of the target node. In 
order to prevent the malicious nodes harming the network, we provide 
three ways to identify suspicious nodes in the network. After the iden-
tification, the trust values of malicious nodes will be lowered, so they 
will be isolated from public key certifications. Nodes with lower trust 
values will not be chosen as introducers in the public key certification 
in the future. 
The first method is to identify malicious neighboring nodes by direct 
monitoring power of individual nodes. Nodes in mobile ad hoc network 
is able to observe the behavior of its 1-hop neighbors directly. This 
can be done by listening the traffic via wireless communications with 
some monitoring component, like watchdog. A number of researches 
50, 12, 56，67] have been carried out on detecting and isolating misbe-
having nodes in the network with cooperation between nodes. All of 
the researches proposed in this area agree on the importance of cooper-
ation between nodes and the work for monitoring the networks should 
be distributed and carried out by every node. Generally, a monitoring 
device will be implemented on every node for detecting misbehavior, 
then iiiechanisrns for the exchange of misbehavior information and iso-
lating the misbehave nodes will be developed. In our authentication 
service, we assume each of the nodes in the network are equipped with 
this capability. 
The second method to isolate malicious nodes by identifying suspi-
cious introducers who provide public key certificates different from the 
CHAPTER 5. TRUST- AND CL USTERING-BASED A UTHENTICATION SERVICE52 
others. In each of the public key certificates request, a node finds more 
than one introducers to collect multiple reply messages. After decrypt-
ing the public key certificates by using the introducers' public keys, it 
can read the public key of the target node provided by the introducers. 
The replied public key should be the same if all the introducers are 
honestly replying the correct answer. If there exists some introducers 
who provide public key of the target node which is different from the 
others, then these introducers is suspected to be malicious. It should 
be noted that using majority vote may not be able to identify mali-
cious nodes when there are colluding nodes in the network. A set of 
nodes can collude to provide an incorrect public key, and these nodes 
may represent the majority opinion. To deal with this case, nodes have 
to update the trust values of the others throughout their experience in 
using the public keys. They can learn about the correctness of the keys 
by using them. 
The third method allows the requesting node to identify the target 
node as malicious if the trust values provided from the introducers in-
dicate that. After the requesting node sends the message asking for 
public key of the target node, its introducers reply with the public key 
certificates. In each of these public key certificates, it includes not only 
the ID and public key of the target node, but also the trust value from 
that particular introducer to the target node. With these values, the 
requesting node can analyze them and summarize the trust value of 
the target node. If the trust value of the target node is lower than a 
certain threshold, then the target node is indicated as dishonest. The 
requesting node will update the trust value of the target node and pre-
vent from selecting them as introducers in public key certification in 
the future. Similar to the above case, a set of introducers can collude 
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Figure 5.3: Trust Value Update 
and provide an incorrect trust value of the target node. They may 
assign an honest node with very low trust value or assign a colluding 
node with very high trust value to increase their influence in the net-
work. To make our approach more practical, the trust value update 
algorithm should not be limited to public key certification. It is more 
reasonable for a node to update the trust value of the other nodes that 
it has communicated with. 
5.2.3 Trust Value Update 
After collecting and decrypting the reply messages, the relying node 
obtains the trust values from different introducers ik to t. These values 
can be used to calculate the ultimate trust value Vt of t in the view of 
s as shown in Figure 5.3. 
In this figure, s denotes the requesting node; t denotes the target 
node, whose public key is requested by s. Nodes ii, ’ in are 
the introducers that reply to s with consistent public keys of t. V^ i.t, 
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Vi^^t, •.. yin,t denote trust values from introducers ii, 12,.in to t; 
whileVjj^ t, Vi2,t, ... denote trust values from s to introducers Zi, 
么2，...，in- Each Vs’i* and 1/“’, form a pair to make up a single trust 
path from s to t. To compute a new trust relationship from s to i of a 
single path, we apply the following formula: 
= O K w = 1 - (1 - (5.4) 
It calculates the new recommendation trust relationship from s to 
t via an introducer i^. With this formula, we can calculate the three 
different trust values from s to i via these three introducers on different 
path separately. The result values are usually different, so one has to 
find a way to draw a consistent conclusion. Actually, the different 
values do not imply a contradiction. In contrary, it can be used as 
collective information to compute a combined value. The following 
formula can be applied: 
K = (5.5) 
where n denotes the number of paths. 
This formula combines trust values of different paths to give . 
the ultimate trust value Vt of t. This ultimate trust value Vt represents 
the trust value of t in the view of s after the public key certification. 
This value contains information of trust relationships from s to different 
introducers, and that from introducers to t. Finally, this value will be 
inserted to the trust table of s. If Vt is high, it indicates that t can be a 
possible introducer when s requests for public keys of other nodes that 
belong to the same group of t in the future. Apart from the trust value 
of the target, the trust value of the introducers will also be updated. 
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The introducers whom were found to be malicious, their trust value 
will be lowered and be isolated. In contrary, the requesting node will 
gradually increase the trust values of the introducers whom provide 
correct public key certificates of the target nodes. 
As mentioned before, the trust value update algorithm can be ap-
plied not only when a node receives replies in public key certification. 
A node can update trust values of the any other nodes in their daily 
communications. It is more reliable for a node to adjust the trust values 
of other nodes according to its experiences in using their public keys 
or coniniuriicatiiig with them. The localized trust value update ap-
proach strongly relies on a node's experience to make judgement about 
the network security. Its continuous update nature prevents colluding 
nodes from dominating the network upon a single event, like public key 
certification. 
5.3 Special Scenarios 
5.3.1 Join the network 
W h e n a node first joined into the network, it can only communicate 
with its neighboring nodes. It broadcasts the joining message to its 
neighboring nodes and build up intragroup trust relationship with the 
nodes in the same cluster. Since it is new to the network, it has no 
experience in conimunicating with the nodes in other groups. W h e n 
a new node requests for the public key certificate of nodes in other 
groups, it collects the information from its group members as inter-
group trust relationship has not yet been built up. In the early stage 
of a node joining into the network, it relies on the intragroup relation-
ship in coniinunicating with the others, including the nodes in different 
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groups. After several communications are made to the nodes in dif-
ferent groups, the new node can build up intergroup trust relationship 
gradually. Then, the node can rely on intergroup trust relationship for 
requesting the public key certificates of nodes in different cluster and 
it use iritragroup trust relationship mainly for communication within 
the local group. 
Algorithm 6 shows the procedure when a new node joins the net-
work. A new node firsts sends a "hello" message to its neighboring 
nodes and asks for the clusterhead ID. After receiving the reply, it 
sends a "join" message to the clusterhead it selected. The clusterhead 
will then update its inember list to include the new node. Update on 
the member list will be sent to the cluster members and other cluster-
heads periodically for update purpose. The new node will also generate 
its own pair of public key and private key. Then, it will exchange its 
public key with its neighboring nodes. The new node and its neigh-
boring cluster members will initialize the trust values of each other 
as 0.5. It is the startup of their trust relationship, these trust values 
will be updated gradually later with the proceeding of their behavior 
monitoring work. 
5.3.2 M o v e to another cluster 
As mentioned before, nodes in mobile ad hoc network are free to move 
around. It is normal for them to leave the original cluster and join 
another one during its move. Algorithm 7 shows the procedure of 
the move. Given a node Vn moves from cluster CLU ST A to cluster 
CLUSTB- 111 our authentication service, clusterlieads in the network 
will broadcast "hello" message to its cluster members periodically. This 
allows the nodes to know if they are still staying in the same cluster. If 
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Algorithm 6 Joining of a new node 
Given a graph G = (V, E) with n = with nodes Vi e V and a new 
node i^n+i. Also, the graph with several clusters. 
1： Vn+i sends a message to its neighboring nodes to look for the ID of the 
clusterhead: 
Vn+l — Vneighbork • 1, REQcLUSTHEADid )； 
2: Neighboring nodes reply with the ID of the clusterhead: 
Vneighbork — : 1 , ) ； 
3： Vji+i sends a joining message to the clusterhead: 
”n+l — VHeadA : JOIN、., 
4： V Head A Updates the member list, where Va ：= Va U {vn+i}； 
5： generates a pair of public key •Pi^n+i and private key SKn+i] 
G: for each Vneighbork do 
7： Vn+i exchanges its public key PKn+i with those of Vneighboi-k• 
Vn+l 么 Vneighbork :〈”n+1，户〉； 
Vneighbork ~^ ^n+1 : {'^neighbor^ i ^ ^^neighbovk )! 
8： 1*71+1 and Vneighbork initialize the trust value of each other to be 0.5; 
9： end for 
10： V Head A broadcasts the joining of Vn+\ to other clusterheads at certain 
time later: 
VffeadA — ^Headk : {^A := K l U V时1〉； 
a node does not receive message from clusterhead for a period of time, 
it will know its leave from the original cluster. When a node discovers 
such a leave, it will broadcast a request message to its neighboring 
nodes to obtain the cluster ID of them. After receiving the replies, 
similar to the situation when a new node joins, it joins one of the 
clusterhead by sending it joining message. Then, it exchanges its public 
key with its new neighbors. They update the trust values with each 
other. Finally, the update of the membership will be broadcasted to 
the cluster ineinbers and the other clusterheads. 
5.3.3 Not Enough Introducer 
A node requests for public key certificates of the target nodes that are 
new to tlieiii and in different groups via some introducers. Introducers 
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Algorithm 7 Move from a cluster to another 
Given a node Vn moves from C LUST A to CLUSTB- Provided that each 
clusterhead constantly broadcast "hello" message in the cluster: 
1： VN discover its leave from CLUSTA as it does not receive "Hello" message 
from Head A ； 
2: Vn sends a message to its neighboring nodes to look for the ID of the , 
clusterhead: ； 
'^n ^ '^neighbor^ ：{VN, REQCLUSTHEADID)'^ ！ 
3： New neighbors reply with the ID of the clusterhead: \ 
Vneighboi-k — ^n : {Vn,VHeado)y ； 
4: Vn sends a joining message to the Heads'-
Vn — VHeado : {Vn,JOIN)\ ： 
5： Heads updates the member list, where VB ：= VB U ‘ 
6: for each Vneighbon d o 
7: if Vn not know Vneighboi-k then 
8： Vn exchanges its public key PKn with those of Vneighbork • 
'^n —^  '^neighbork '•、”n, PKn、\ 
”neighbork ~^ '^n ‘ {'^neighbork > ^ ^^neighbor^ )! 
9： Vn and Vneighbork initialize the trust value of each other to be 0.5; 
10： end if 
11： end for 
12： VHeads broadcasts the joining of Vn to other clusterlieads at certain time 
later: 
VHeadu — VHeadk : {^3 •= VB U 
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are the nodes in the same group of the target node and have intergroup 
trust relationship with the relying node. In some situations, the relying 
node may find not enough introducers to request for public key certifi-
cates of the nodes in other groups. These situations may be at the early 
stage of a node in the network or a node finds that most of the nodes 
ill another group that it built up intergroup trust relationships become 
malicious. If there are not enough introducers in the target group, the 
relying node will choose nodes with high values from its own group 
to be introducers. It should be noted that a node request public key 
certificates of the node in another group always find introducers from 
the target group as the first choice. It finds introducers from its lo-
cal only if it is unable to find enough number of introducers from the 
target group. A node chooses introducers from the target group with 
higher priority than from the local group. It is because nodes in the 
same group with the target nodes are able to collect more information 
on the trust of the target node with the relatively shorter distances. 
Ill contrary, introducer in the same group with the relying node only 
provides information of its past comniuriication with the target node 
and the not up-to-date trust information collected when it requested 
for the public key certificate of the target node. 
• E n d of chapter. 
Chapter 6 
Simulations and Results 
In this chapter, we evaluate the performance of the authentication ser-
vice proposed in terms of security by extensive simulations. 
6.1 Authentication Service Based on Trust and 
Network Models 
6.1.1 Experiments Set-Up 
W e iiiiplemeiited our design in network simulator Gloniosim [72j.Our i 
main objective in the security evaluation is to investigate whether our i 
authentication service provides effective measurement results in public 
key certifications with the presence of malicious nodes. W e imitate 
the malicious nodes by selecting certain percentage of the nodes in 
the network randomly and assign tliem to reply with false public key 
certificates. A false public key certificate may contain an incorrect 
public key and trust value of the target node. 
The base settings that apply for most of the experiments are sum-
marized ill Table 6.1. The settings represent a wireless ad hoc network 
with the size of 600in x 600m. It contains 100 nodes and is divided 
65 
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into 5 groups. The network size and the number of nodes are set in 
these values to make sure the network density is high enough to build a 
connected network. The number of introducers per request is three. It 
is selected as an odd number to bring a conclusion based on majority 
votes. This number should be large enough to avoid incorrect conclu-
sion due to malicious nodes, but it should not be too large such that 
a requesting node can find enough number of introducers for public 
key certification. In this thesis, we use 802.11 as the M A C protocol 
ill the experiments. IEEE 802.11 has a higher data rate and trarisinis- ！ 
I 
siori range in compare with bluetootli, so it provides more bandwidth • 
for coiiiiiiunications and public key certifications in our authentication 
service. Also, its transmission range allows a network to be formed in 
a larger area and with high nuniber of nodes. A certain percentage of 
nodes p is regarded as trustable at initialization and certain percent-
age of nodes in becomes malicious when the simulation begins. W e 
are particularly interested in the successful rate, fail rate, unreachable 
rate, and type I and type II error rate in our protocol. W e vary dif-
ferent parameter in each of the experiment, including the percentage 
of trustable nodes at initialization, percentage of malicious nodes, arid 
the mobility of the nodes. In the last experiment, we compare the 
successful rate, fail rate, and unreachable rate between our protocol 
and the P G P approach with distributed certificate repository. Yet, 
our experiments indicate that our scheme works well even in a hostile 
environment. 
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Table 6.1: Simulation Parameters 
Network 
Network size 600m 600m — 
No. ot nodes — ITO — 
No. of groups 5 
% of trustable nodes at initialization 2 
% of malicious nodes m  
M obility 
Mobility Random-Waypoint 
Pause Time — 20s ~ 
Maximum speed lOm/s 
FublicK eyCertification 
Max. no. of introducers for each request 3 
Mill, no. of reply for each request — 1 
No. of query cycles — 80 
No. of requests per cycles — 100 
Simulation Time lUWUUs : 
6 . 1 . 2 Simulation Results 
Evaluation on Ratings to Malicious Nodes 
111 this experiment, we evaluate the successful rate, fail rate, unreach-
able rate, false-positive error rate, and false-negative error rate of the 
authentication service proposed. Successful rate is the percentage of 
public key requests that lead to a conclusion of the new node's public 
key. Fail rate is the percentage of public key requests that are unable 
to make a conclusion of the new node's public key or the conclusion 
drawn is incorrect. Unreachable rate is the percentage of public key-
requests that are unable to be sent out or the requests have no reply. 
A request unable to be sent out may due to no trustable introducer is 
available, or the request messages cannot reach the introducers. It is 
also possible that the request messages are sent, but the messages are 
dropped or unreachable to the requesting node in the reply. 
Apart from the successful rate, fail rate, and unreachable rate dis-
cussed above, we also carry out the Type I and Type II error tests. W e 
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evaluate the false-negative error rate on identifying malicious nodes in 
the Type I error test and the false-positive error rate in identifying 
malicious nodes in the Type II error test. In the authentication service 
we propose, nodes requesting for the public key of a new node compare 
the public key certificates it received from introducers and try to make 
a conclusion by the majority votes. If it discovers certain replies of 
the public key are different from that of the majority, then it suspects 
the nodes as malicious and lowers their trust values. With this voting 
algoritliin, it is possible for it to incorrectly identify trustable nodes as 
malicious. W e assume that the malicious nodes are not forming mali-
cious peer in the network, so they have low probability to reply with a 
consistent false public key in the certificates. The following examples 
illustrate how false-positive and false-negative errors may occur, where 
"O" indicates a certificate replied by a good node and "X" indicates a 
certificate replied by a malicious node: 
Examples of false-positive error: 
"O X " Two public key certificates are received from the replies and 
they are different from each other. The relying node can make 
no conclusion on the new node's public key in this case and it 
concludes that either both or any one of the replies are come 
from malicious nodes. To put the authentication service in the 
safest place, it lowers the trust values of both nodes to avoid any 
malicious node to be selected as introducers in the future. If one 
of the reply nodes is indeed trustable in this situation, then a 
false-positive error occurs as it falsely suggests that a node as 
malicious which it is actually not. 
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" O X X " Similar situation occurs when three different public key 
certificates are received in the replies. The requesting node can 
make no conclusion on the new node's public key again in this 
case and it concludes that either all or any one of the replies are 
come from malicious nodes. To keep the network safe, it lowers 
the trust values of all the nodes to avoid any malicious to be 
selected as introducers in the future. If one of the introducer is 
actually a good node, then a false-positive error occurs again in 
this case. 
Not only false-positive errors may occur in the system, but false-
negative errors also. The following example shows how false-negative 
error that may occur in public key certification: 
Example of false-negative error: 
"X" The relying node receives only one reply message, so it has no 
chance to make comparison and conclude the new node's public 
key by majority votes. In this situation, the relying node may 
believe the reply is trustable as there is no evidence showing 
inconsistency of the received public key. It may assume this 
public key certificate is correct to allow its communication with 
the new node. Unfortunately, if the replying node is indeed 
malicious, then a false-negative error occurs. 
Figure 6.1 shows the successful rate, fail rate, urireadiable rate, 
false-positive error rate, and false-negative error rate in the autlienti-
catioii service we propose with the percentage of malicious nodes varies 
from 0% to 100%. The percentage of trustable at initialization is fixed 
at 40% ill Figure 6.1a and at 70% in Figure 6.1b respectively. In both 
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figures, the successful rate drops with the percentage of malicious nodes 
increases. It is because more false public key certificates are received 
with the increased number of malicious nodes in the network. With the 
above reason, it is hard for the requesting node to draw a conclusion 
oil the public key of the new node, so the successful rate decreases. 
The fail rate on the hand increases gradually with the percentage of 
malicious nodes. It lias the same reason as the drop of the successful 
rate. The unreachable rate increases dramatically with the percent-
age of malicious nodes. It is due to large amount of nodes initially 
trustable becomes malicious in the network. These malicious nodes 
can no longer be introducers upon being discovered and isolated. Some 
requesting nodes may not be able to contact any introducer as none 
of them remains trustable on its list, so public key certificate requests 
cannot be sent. 
From the above figures, we can observer that false-positive error 
rate and false-negative error rate increase with the percentage of mali-
cious nodes as well. The false-positive error rate of both graphs begin 
from zero and rise gradually from 30% to 70% and then drops to zero 
gradually afterwards. In our experiment, the iiuinber of introducers 
is three, which means a relying node sends request messages to three 
introducers in each public key request. The rise and drop of the false-
positive rate is related to the probability of having the two cases of 
false-positive errors ("OX" and "OXX") from the replies. The false-
negative rate rises as there is a higher probability to receive only a 
single reply from a malicious node when the percentage of malicious 
nodes increases. The reason is that the higher the percentage of ma-
licious nodes leads to smaller niiinber of trustable introducers left in 
the network, so a node has a higher chance to find only one introducer 
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to sign valid public key certificate. However, this remaining introducer 
also has a higher probability to be a malicious node. 
In comparing the two figures, we find that Figure 6.1a has a lower 
successful rate, higher unreachable rate, lower failure rate, and lower 
false-positive rate than Figure 6.1b. The lower successful rate and the 
higher unreachable rate in Figure 6.1a are because of the less trustable 
introducers are available in public key certification with the face that 
the percentage of trustable node at initialization in Figure 6.1a is much 
lower than that of Figure 6.1b. The lower failure of Figure 6.1a is due 
to smaller iimnber of malicious nodes has to be discovered. Since only 
trustable nodes will be selected as introducers, the higher the percent-
age of trustable nodes at initialization leads to the greater number of 
malicious nodes have to be discovered to avoid false public key certifi-
cation. The malicious node discovering algorithm is based on majority 
voting in our authentication service. Normally, the more public key 
certificate request made, the higher number of malicious nodes can be 
identified. In this experiment, both figures run for 80 cycles and the 
experiment results are the average of each rating during the whole sim-
ulation. It is reasonable that Figure 6.1b receive more false certificates 
than Figure 6.1a, so it has higher failure rate and false-positive rate 
than Figure 6.1a. 
Evaluation on Ratings to Trustable Nodes at Initialization 
Similar to the above experiment, the successful rate, fail rate, unreacli-
able rate, false-positive error rate, and false-negative error rate are 
evaluated. However, we fix the percentage of malicious nodes and vary 
the percentage of trustable nodes at initialization in this experiment. 
W e set the percentage of malicious nodes at 40% in Figure 6.2a and 
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Figure 6.1: Ratings to Percentage of Malicious Nodes 
at 70% in Figure 6.2b, then vary the percentage of trustable nodes at 
initialization from 0% to 100%. Both figures show the successful rate 
increases and the unreachable rate decreases with the increase on the 
percentage of trustable nodes at initialization. It is because greater 
iiimiber of nodes can be selected as introducers for public key certifica-
tions if there is more trustable nodes at initialization. The increase of 
fail rate is due to more number of malicious nodes need to be discov-
ered as greater number of nodes appear to be trustable initially become 
malicious later. 
Ill comparing the two figures, Figure 6.2a has a higher successful 
rate, lower fail rate, unreachable rate, false-positive rate, and false-
negative rate in compare with Figure 6.2b. The performance in terms 
of security of Figure 6.2a is better than that of Figure 6.2b overall. It 
is reasonable that a network with lower percentage of malicious nodes 
to be more secure in public key authentication. 
Evaluation on Convergence Time 
W e investigate the convergence time of our authentication service in 
this experiment. Again, the same ratings, including the successful rate, 
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Figure 6.2: Ratings to Percentages of Trustable Nodes at Initialization 
fail rate, iiiireacliable rate, false-positive error rate, and false-negative 
error rate are evaluated. W e plot different ratings every five cycles in 
this experiment to get the time of convergence. At the time of conver-
gence, all the ratings are expected to become steady. Since malicious 
nodes are assigned raiidoinly at the beginning of the experiment, mali-
cious nodes will be discovered gradually and the ratings will vary during 
this period of time. The convergence time represents the moment that 
most of the malicious nodes in the network are discovered, so all the 
ratings become steady upon it. 
Ill Figure 6.3a, the percentage of malicious nodes and the percentage 
of trustable nodes at initialization are both fixed at 40%. From the 
experiment results, we observe that each rating converges to a certain 
limit value s after certain number of cycles. For example, it shows that 
the successful rate converges to around 85.4%, fail rate converges to 
0.6%, unreachable rate converges to 14%, false-positive rate converges 
to 0.6%, and false-negative rate converges to 0% in Figure 6.3a. W e 
define n as the nuniber of cycles, s as the limit value, x as one of the 
rating at certain cycle. There exists a positive integer N such that 
when n > N, we have \xn - s| < If we set ^  to be 2% for the 
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Figure 6.3: Ratings to No. of Cycles 
successful rate N is equal to 25 in Figure 6.3a, while N is equal to 
30 ill Figure 6.3b. 
Evaluation on Ratings to Mobility 
111 this experiment, we investigate the influence of mobility to the au-
thentication protocol we propose. Throughout all simulations, a relying 
node sends out public key certificate request to three introducers and 
gets back their replies. The network size is 600ni x 600m with 100 
nodes, which allow most of the request and reply messages to reach 
their destinations. Figure 6.4 shows the distribution of the ratings 
under different mobility of nodes. It evaluates the successful rate, fail 
rate, unreachable rate, false-positive error rate, and false-negative error 
rate with the percentage of trustable nodes at initialization to be fixed 
at 40% and the percentage of malicious nodes to be fixed at 60%. W e 
vary the mobility of nodes by setting the maximum speeds of nodes at 
Oni/s, 5m/s, lOrii/s, 15iii/s, and 20m/s respectively. The authentica-
tion service we propose maintains almost constant distribution under 
different mobility conditions as shown in Figure 6.4. Since the network 
size is not large in compare with the number of nodes, the transmission 
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Figure 6.4: Ratings to Mobility 
range of a node normally can cover any of its neighboring nodes. Sim-
ilar result showing the mobility independent with the successful rate 
has been appeared in another paper. This paper employed a simple 
flooding protocol to iinplement a practical key management framework 
for ad hoc wireless network [68]. It believes independency of the mo-
bility is because of the effectiveness of flooding as the reliable data 
disseniiiiatiori method. 
Comparison with the P G P Approach 
In this sub-section, we compare our authentication service with the 
web of trust model in Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). W e judge against 
their performance in protecting network security during public key cer-
tification. A fully self-organizing public key iiiaiiagement system using 
certificate graph, which is similar to PGP, was proposed in ad hoc 
wireless network [16]. It proposed an algorithm for the construction of 
the local certificate repositories to help users to find certificate chains 
to each other in their merged repository. The certificates of this ap-
proach are stored and distributed by the nodes and unlike in PGP, 
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where certificates are stored in centralized. It implies that the web 
of trust model of P G P is applicable to wireless ad hoc networks with 
certain adjustment. 
Ill a P G P environment, any user can act as a certifying authority. 
A P G P user validates another P G P user's public key certificate if the 
relying party recognizes the validator as a trusted introducer. Usu-
ally, a keyring stores the validity of a particular key and the level of 
trust it placed on the key that the key's owner can serve as certifier of 
other's key. There are three levels of validity in PGP, including Valid, 
Marginally Valid, and Invalid. P G P requires one Completely trusted 
signatures or two Marginally trusted signature to establish a key as 
valid. Although P G P involves a trust model with three levels of trust 
and three levels of validity in public key certification, it does not have 
any measurement in handling malicious nodes that issue false certifi-
cates. It assumes that the public key certificate and the level of trust 
of a node are valid during its validity period, but this does not reflect 
the reality. It is because attackers may compromise a node suddenly 
without being discovered, so it is important to protect authentication 
against malicious nodes. To deal with the problem of false certificates 
signed by undiscovered malicious nodes, we propose a novel public key 
authentication approach based on the trust and clustering techniques. 
Ill coinparing our trust- and clustering-based approach with the 
original P G P approach, our approach is different in distributing repos-
itory on certificates among all the nodes. In the original P G P approach, 
it just defines three levels of trust for a node. In our approach, the trust 
is defined as a continuous value between 0.0 and 1.0. Therefore, a more 
accurate trust level can be expressed in our approach than in the orig-
inal P G P approach. Moreover, the original P G P approach relies on 
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a single trust chain with multiple intermediate nodes to acquire the 
public key certificate of a new node. In our approach, a trust chain 
only involves on one intermediate node to reduce the probability for 
obtaining an invalid trust chain, which involves any malicious nodes. 
The only intermediate node on a trust chain is in the same cluster as 
the target node. The close distance between the intermediate node and 
the target node enhance the performance of the monitoring component 
on the intermediate node. This increases the correctness for the inter-
mediate node to introduce the target node and estimate its trust value. 
Also, it relies on multiple trust chains instead of single trust chain in 
our approach. The public key certificates of the target node signed by 
different introducers will be compared. Certificates different from the 
majority votes will be identified and the introducer who signs these 
suspicious certificates will be isolated gradually. The trust values from 
different introducers on the target node will be gathered and summa-
rized, and finally be updated to the trust table of the relying node. In 
summary, our approach makes use the behavior monitoring advantage 
and the hierarchical architecture brought by the clustering techniques 
to develop an authentication procedure that involves multiple trust 
chains and single intermediate node in each chain. The security is fur-
ther enhanced by the idea of majority voting and the combination and 
calculation of continuous trust values among the nodes. It promotes the 
identification and isolation of malicious nodes, and provides a highly 
secure public key authentication service in mobile ad hoc network. 
The P G P approach we implemented in this experiment distributes 
certificate repository among all the nodes to fit the characteristics of 
wireless ad hoc networks. Similar to the fully self-organizing public key 
management system using certificate graph proposed in [16], a relying 
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node has to look for a certificate chain to perform authentication. It 
shows from our experiment results that a relying node is able to find 
a trust chain usually with only one intimidate node. It is probably 
because the density of nodes in our network is pretty hight. Due to 
this reason, the P G P approach with distributed certificate repository 
we implemented is fairly simple as complicate algorithm on finding 
a trust chain is not required. This experiment focuses on the secu-
rity evaluation, instead of performance evaluation, between our new 
authentication protocol and the P G P approach with distributed cer-
tificate repository, which is different from the work of the others. 
In Figure 6.5, it shows the successful rate, failure rate, and unreach-
able rate of our authentication service and the P G P approach. W e fix 
the percentage of trustable nodes at initialization to be 40% and 70% 
respectively and vary the percentage of malicious nodes m from 0% to 
100%. With certain percentage of nodes p is initialized as trustable in 
the network, a node finds it generally easy to find a valid introducer 
ill PGP. However, there is a probability rn for those nodes to become 
malicious in public key certification. Since there is no mechanism to 
handling the malicious nodes in PGP, it has a pretty high fail rate 
ill public key certification especially when the percentage of malicious 
nodes is high. The rise of the fail rate in P G P leads to the drop of 
its successful rate when the percentage of malicious nodes increases. 
Ill contrast, our authentication service has a more sophisticated trust 
model with a well defined quantitative authentication metric in com-
pare with the P G P approach. Also, its public key certification involves 
request to multiple introducers, so a relying node is able to identify 
the malicious nodes by comparing the certificates in the replies. A 
malicious node in authentication can issue false certificates that are 
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different from the majority. After these malicious are discovered, they 
will be isolate from public key certification in the future. This leads 
to the higher successful rate and lower fail rate in our approach than 
the P G P approach. It should be noted that the unreachable rate of 
our scheme increase with the percentage of malicious nodes as the in-
creased number of malicious nodes decreases the number of trustable 
introducers available. However, the unreachable rate keeps zero in the 
P G P approach as there is no mechanism to detect and isolate malicious 
nodes during authentication. 
Figure 6.6 shows the same comparison of our approach with the 
P G P approach as above. The main difference is that it fixes the per-
centage of malicious nodes instead of the percentage of trustable nodes 
at initialization in this experiment. The percentage of malicious nodes 
is fixed at 40% and 70% respectively with the percentage of trustable 
nodes at initialization varies from 0% to 100%. It shows that our 
scheme out perform the P G P approach by having a higher successful 
rate and lower fail rate in average. This is mainly due to the suc-
cess of our authentication service in identifying and isolating malicious 
nodes in public key certification as we discussed before. A special 
plienoineiion occurs when the percentage of trustable nodes at initial-
ization p is equal to 10%, we find that the P G P approach perforins 
better than our approach. This may due to the fail rate of the P G P 
approach keeps at m and its fail rate keeps at (1 — m ) constantly upon 
the percentage of trustable nodes is greater than zero. On the other 
hand, the malicious introducers are identified in our authentication ser-
vice, so there may not be enough number of introducers in the network 
when the percentage of trustable nodes at initialization is only 10%. 
The increase of unreachable rate leads to the decrease of successful 
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rate in the authentication service we propose subsequently. Though 
the P G P approach has a higher successful rate when p is equal to 10%, 
it gives a higher fail rate at the same time that is more harmful than 
our protocol. 
Ill this part, we analysis the successful rate and fail rate of the our 
authentication service and the P G P approach with distributed certifi-
cate repository base on the setting of our experiment. In our anal-
ysis, the relying nodes under the P G P approach can always find an 
introducer with Complete trust due to certain percentage of nodes are 
regarded as trustable at initialization and some of them are assigned 
with high trust level in our network. W e assume that all of the request 
in the P G P approach are handled by a Complete trust introducer in 
the following analysis. Let rrit be the percentage of malicious nodes in 
the set of trustable nodes at certain time t. It should be noted that 
the set size of the trustable nodes may vary with time. 
The successful rate of P G P at time t is: 
1 - rrit (6.1) 
The successful rate of the authentication service we propose at time 
t is: 
(6.2) 
where Pk is the probability of receiving k certificate replies, for 1 < 
k < 3. 
The fail rate of P G P at time t is: 
rnt (6.3) 
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The fail rate of the authentication service we propose at time t is: 
(6.4) 
where Pk is the probability of receiving k certificate replies, for 1 < 
k < 3. 
Ill the P G P approach, this value nit is equal to the percentage of 
malicious nodes rn that we fix at the beginning of the experiment as 
it has no algorithni to isolate malicious nodes. However, this value mt 
decreases as the nuiiiber of requests made increases in the authentica-
tion service we propose as its security operations help to discover and 
isolate malicious nodes. 
It appears that our authentication service performs better than the 
P G P approach in protecting network security on public key authenti-
cation. Nevertheless, it consumes more network bandwidth and C P U 
resources than the P G P approach. In the P G P approach, normally 
only one request and reply message pair are required in the case of 
involving introducer with Complete trust. Even there is no Complete 
trust introducer, two Marginally introducers take only two message 
pairs per request only. In our authentication service, the number of 
message pairs per request is as same as the number of introducers, n. 
Therefore, it generates more network traffic than PGP. 
Message pairs per request in P G P approach is formulated as follow: 
Pi* 1 + ^2*2 = 0(1), 
where Pi indicates the probability for having 1 Complete trust intro-
ducer and 尸2 indicates the probability for having 2 Marginally trust 
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introducers. 
Message pairs per request in our authentication service is formulated 
as follow: 
0(n) 
Also, our approach requires the relying node to compare all the 
certificate replies and conclude with the majority votes, which takes 
the amount of time: 
0{n log 11 + n) = 0{n log n) 
111 addition, the relying node lias to calculate the quantitative trust 
value of the target node and update the trust table, which is 0(n). 
All these operations consume more C P U resources of the relying node 
than the P G P approach though it seems to be necessary in order to 
protect the network security. 
The C P U cost per request in the authentication service proposed is: 
(9(71 log n) 
The C P U cost per request in P G P approach is: 
O⑴ 
Furthermore, the authentication service we propose assume an un-
derlying clustering algorithm in the network. Messages for exchanging 
grouping information are required among the nodes, which increases 
the network overhead in the system as well. 
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6.2 Clusters Formation and Maintenance 
6.2.1 Experiments Set-Up 
In this experiment, we implemented the algorithms for network clus-
ters formation and maintenance. W e adopted the max-rnin clustering 
formation algorithm with some modification. In our approach, a node 
has to gather information from the neighboring nodes for the trust of 
itself. Also, the criteria for winning in a max round or min round does 
not depend on the node ID, but the trust value of the node from its 
neighbors. This experiment studies the formation of clustering based 
on the trust values among the nodes. Table 6.2 shows the parameter 
settings of this experiment. The network size is set to 1500m X 1500m 
and the number of nodes is set to 40. This experiment studies the 
network behavior on clustering structure formation and maintenance. 
It emulates a network with a normal node density. A node is able 
to contact a few neighborhoods directly in this network density. Its 
neighborhoods will change accordingly after moving to new locations. 
The niiniber of introducer is selected to be three to make sure a node 
can find enough number of introducers in a cluster. This value also 
provides an conclusion by majority votes effectively. 
Apart from the the clustering formation algorithm which is invoked 
at the initialization of the network, we propose some algorithms for 
iiiaiiitaiiiiiig a balance clustering structures in a highly mobile network. 
W e believe a balance clustering structure, which means the sizes of 
each cluster are similar, benefits to our trust model and hence the 
autlienticatioii service we proposed. These algorithms adapt to the 
change of network topology. It provides strategy for a node to choose a 
suitable cluster to join while it is moving around. A node may leave the 
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original cluster and join another cluster after moving from one location 
to another. To maintain the clustering structure up-to-date, such that 
every nodes are joining the right clusters, each node broadcast a request 
to collect the cluster ID of its neighboring nodes periodically. To make 
it simple, we call such a period, a cycle. After receiving the reply from 
it neighbors, a node run the network maintenance algorithm to select 
and join the right cluster. W e introduce three approaches and compare 
their performance in this experiment. The simulation is run for 40 
cycles to study the behavior of the network in terms of the sizes of 
the clusters and the number of cycle that a node usually spends in the 
same cycle continuously. 
Table 6.2: Simulation Parameters 
N etwork  
Network size 1500m x l50Um 
JNo. ot nodes 4U 
% of malicious nodes 爪 
Clustering 
D-hops 3 
Mill, cluster size 巧 
Max. cluster size L 
Mobility 
Mobility Random-Waypoint 
Pause'lime ‘她 _ 
Maximum speed lOm/s 
Public Key Certification — 
Max. no. of introducers for each request 3 
Mill, no. of reply for each request 1� 
No. of query cycles 40 
= Simulation Time 4000s 
6.2.2 Simulation Results 
Evaluation on Cluster Sizes 
111 the first approach, a node joins the neighboring cluster with rnini-
murii size every cycle after it collected the cluster ID of its neighboring 
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Figure 6.7: Clusters Sizes to No. of Cycles in Approach 1 
nodes. Figure 6.7 shows the number of nodes of each cluster in different 
cycles ill the network life. There are totally 40 nodes in the network. 
After the running of the max-niin clustering algorithm, there are four 
clusters being formed. The cluster IDs are 40, 19, 27 and 30. It shows 
that the sizes of the clusters are not balance immediately after the 
formation of the clustering structure in cycle 0. However, each node 
requests for the cluster ID of its neighbors and update its cluster ID 
by joining the neighboring cluster with minimum size. The sizes of the 
clusters become balance after only several cycles. This condition was 
keep afterwards with this cluster maintenance algorithm. 
In the second approach, a node joins the neighboring cluster with 
iiiiiiiinuin only if it leaves the original cluster. A node collects the 
cluster IDs of its neighboring nodes and it changes to a new cluster 
only if the neighboring cluster IDs do not include its original cluster 
ID. This algorithm sounds effective, but it leads to a serious problem. 
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Prom Figure 6.8，we found that all the nodes will be converged to one 
cluster gradually. This algorithm does not lead to a balance clustering 
structures in the network. 
Ill the third approach, a node joins the neighboring cluster with 
minimum size if it leaves the original cluster or if the sizes of its neigh-
boring clusters are not with a certain threshold, such as S < size < L. 
W h e n a node received the cluster IDs of it neighbors, it checks whether 
its current cluster ID was included. If it is included, it means the node 
does not leave its original cluster. Otherwise, it joins the neighboring 
with iiiinimum size, similar to the first two approaches. However, even 
a node does not leave its original cluster, it may still have to join an-
other cluster if its any of its neighboring clusters is found to have a 
network size exceeding the defined range S and L. Figure 6.9 shows 
the cluster sizes are pretty balance. 
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Evaluation on No. of Cycles that a Node Stays in the Same Cluster 
U p to now, we have studied the effectiveness in maintaining a balance 
clustering structures among the three approaches. From the above ex-
periment results, both approach 1 and approach 3 brings to satisfactory 
result. In Figure 6.10’ it further studies the performance of the three 
approach. It shows the number of changes in rnembersliip in each of 
the approaches. The number of nodes which join a new cluster means a 
frequent change of clustering memberships. From this figure, we found 
that the approach 2 out perform the others, but it can not be adopted 
since it does not lead to a balance network model. In comparison be-
tween approach 1 and approach 3, it shows that approach 3 involves 
few number of membership changes among the clusters. Therefore, 
approach 3 is adopted as our network maintenance algorithm. 
Figure 6.11 and Figure 6.12 show the nuinber of cycles that a node 
stays in the cluster. It shows that most of the nodes stay for less than 
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1 round. It is because the mobility of nodes is high. 
6.3 Authentication Service Based on Trust and 
Network Models with Clusters Formation and 
Maintenance 
6.3.1 Experiments Set-Up 
111 the following experiments, it simulates a group of nodes in a network 
without any infrastructure. At the beginning of the experiment, the 
clustering algorithm will run and divide the network into several clus-
ters. Also, the nodes will gradually build up trust relationship with 
each other by neighbor monitoring and public key certifications. To 
balance the trust relationship among the nodes, it is desired to main-
tain the clusters in a similar size. The nodes move from one location to 
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another in the mobile ad hoc network. They need to collect information 
about their neighboring nodes and decide joining which of the clusters 
in the network. It is important to update the node and maintain the 
balance size of the clusters. This avoids frequent clustering algorithm 
revocations and the merge and divisions among the clusters. Table 6.3 
shows the parameter settings in the following experiments. This exper-
iment involves 40 nodes with network size of 1500m X 1500m, or 100 
nodes with network size of 3000m X 3000m. A node usually have sev-
eral neighboring nodes under this density. This settings emulate real 
scenario that include the leave and join of the nodes from one cluster 
to another. The size of each cluster is also maintained within a certain 
range for balance and efficient operations in the network. The number 
of introducers is selected to be three again to give a high chance of 
successful public key certification by majority votes. 
Table 6.3: Simulation Parameters 
~ Network _ 
Network size 1500m x 1500m or 30UUm x 3000m 
No. ot nodes n 
一 % of malicious nodes rn  
— Mobiiity 
— Mobility I Random-Waypoint 
Pause Time '20s 
Max. speed lOm/s ~ 
— Clustering 
— D-hops 丨 3 
一 Min. cluster size S 
— Max. cluster size L  
— Neighbor A4onitorinq 
No. of cycles required to identify 
_ malicious neighbors 2 
~ FublicKey Certification 
"Max. no. of introducers tor each request 3 
— Min. no. ot reply tor each request 1 
— JNo. cycles r 
Simulation Time per cycle llU-12Us ~ 
There are totally 11 cases described in Table 6.4. It contains all 
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the possible cases in public key certification with 3 introducers. Case 0 
represents the situation that there is not enough number of introducers 
for supporting this request, so the request message will not be sent. 
It leads to the increase of the unreachable rate. Case 1 to case 10 
represent the cases that the request messages are send and some or all 
public key certificates are received from the introducers. The symbol 
'0' indicates a received certificate which is providing the correct public 
key certificate of the target node, while the symbol 'X' indicates a 
received certificate which is providing an incorrect public key certificate 
of the target node. According to the definitions of the symbols, case 1， 
5, and 8 means the requesting node receives three, two, and one correct 
public key certificates from the introducers respectively. They all lead 
to a successful public key certification request. Requesting node in 
case 2 receives two correct and one incorrect public key certificates. It 
can still conclude with a correct public key successfully by majority 
votes. In contrary, the number of incorrect public key certificates in 
case 3 and 6 are less than or equal to the number of correct public 
key certificates. They are unable to conclude with a correct public key 
certificates by majority votes. Similar situations in cases 4’ 7, and 9， 
where all the received public key certificates are incorrect. All of them 
lead to a failure public key certification on the target node. Although 
the request messages are sent to the introducers, it does not guarantee 
the requesting node can receive all the replies from these introducers. 
In some cases, they receive less than three replies or even receive 0 
replies, just like in case 10. In case 10’ the public key of the target 
node is regarded as unreachable as no public key certificates can be 
obtained from the introducers. 
In a cycle, each of the nodes asks for the neighboring information 
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and updates the clusterhead that it belongs to. It also makes request 
on the public key certificates of one other node in each cycle. The 
requesting node conclude the correct public key of the target node 
by majority votes. At the same time, it may identify the suspicious 
introducers who provide incorrect public keys of the target node. Since 
the requesting node relies on majority vote to identify the malicious 
introducers, it does not always lead to an accurate identification. For 
example, in case 3 and 6, the nuniber of correct certificate is only 
one, it is impossible for the requesting node to identify which is true 
and which is false among the certificates received. In its view, all the 
introducers providing different public key certificates are suspicious. It 
the requesting node isolates all of these introducers, a good node in 
each case will be isolated accidentally. This brings to the false-positive 
error in identifying malicious nodes in the network. In contrary, the 
requesting node only receive one certificate reply in case 9. Even the 
received public key of the target node is incorrect, it is still unable to 
figure it out. The failure in identifying the dishonest introducer leads 
to the false negative error in the identification of malicious nodes in 
the network. 
6.3.2 Simulation Results 
Evaluation on Ratings with Neighbor Monitoring 
111 this experiment, it implements the neighbor monitoring algorithm 
to facilitate the identification of malicious nodes in the network. W h e n 
a node stay in the same cluster for a certain period of time, it may 
have ability to detect and identify the malicious nodes in the network. 
Experiment result is shown in Figure 6.13 with n==40, m二0.3’ and 
r=35. At the initialization, there are a group of nodes in the network 
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Table 6.4: Possible Cases in Public Key Certifications with 3 introducers 
“ Network 
T P state Successful Fail Unreachable False+ False-“ 
0 Not enough Introducer^ \l  
~ T ~ OOP — \/ ； 
OQX x/ — _ , 
" 3 QXX x/  
丁 X X X — 
~ 5 ~ 0 0 s! — 
~6~ O X /^ 
7 X X  
丁 o Y 二 一 , 厂 
_ 9 X IZI ZZZ 
No reply 丨 丨 丨 \ / 丨 
without any infrastructure. The clustering formation algorithm is run, 
and then a number of clusters are formed. The nodes do not know 
each other unless they build up trust relationship with their neighboring 
nodes or they ask for public key certificates via some introducing nodes. 
During the first few rounds of the operations, the high unreachable rate 
is because the trust relationships with other nodes are very limited. 
The number of trust worthy nodes will increase with the time when 
a node moves around and meet new neighbors or they ask for public 
key certificates of other nodes. If there is not enough number of trust 
worthy nodes, a node can hardly find any nodes to be the introducers 
in public key certification. The unreachable rate will drop gradually 
after more rounds. 
Figure 6.14 shows the same experiment running for 100 number 
of rounds. The identification of malicious nodes heavily relies on the 
monitoring power of the neighboring nodes. A node can discover its 
neighbor is malicious only if it has observed that node for a period of 
time (say, for a few rounds). However, the nodes in the network are 
highly mobile, a node usually does not stay in the same cluster for 
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Figure 6.15: Rates to No. of Cycles with n=100, m=0.3, and r=40 
very long time. The monitoring work is therefore quite difficult to be 
carried out. The performance is not very impressive as the successful 
rate is only around 70% which is equal to the percentage of honest 
nodes in the network. Of course, the nodes in the network do not 
know each other at the beginning, so it takes time to build up the trust 
relationships among them. The failure rate is improved to 10% which 
is lower than 30% of malicious nodes in the network. The performance 
of the operations can be improved by identifying malicious nodes in 
public key certification. 
Figure 6.15 shows the same experiment with 100 number of nodes. 
The successful rate is pretty low and the unreachable is quite high even 
the nuinber of cycles reach 40. In comparing with the experiment in the 
network with only 40 nodes, it shows that a network with high number 
of nodes takes longer time to build up trust relationships among nodes 
in order to reach a stable condition in public key certification. 
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Figure 6.16: Rates to No. of Cycles with n=100, m=0.3, and r=100 
Figure 6.16 shows the same experiment with 100 number of nodes 
and rmining for 100 rounds. This experiment shows that the successful 
rate is not so satisfactory with almost 70%. However, the failure rate 
is keep lower than 20%, which is less than the percentage of malicious 
nodes in the network. It shows that the unreachable rate gradually 
drops to around 20% after around 50 cycles. 
Figure 6.17 shows the experiment result with the parameters n=40 
and 7^=100. The percentage of malicious m is defined as 70%, which 
represents a hostile network condition. The successful rate is above 40% 
and the failure rate is around 30%. The unreachable rate is around 
30%. This result is a bit better than randomly select a node as in-
troducer from the network with the assumption that an introducer is 
reachable. Since this assumption is not very realistic, so normally a 
random algorithni is expected to perform even worse. 
Figure 6.18 shows the experiment result with the same parameters 
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setting as the above one, but the network contains more number of 
nodes. It shows that the successful rate does not have any improvement 
in compare with the single and random introducer searching algorithm. 
However, the failure rate is maintained lower than 50% which is lower 
than the 70% of malicious nodes. 
In summary, the above experiment shows the neighboring monitor-
ing power does not lead to great improvement in the successful rate of 
public key certifications. It is probably because the mobility of nodes is 
too high, such that the neighboring monitoring power does not perform 
as well as expected. W e believe that it takes time for a node to collect 
enough data and identify its neighboring nodes as malicious. From the 
experiment result about mobility in the previous experiment, we found 
that most of the nodes stay in the same cluster for less than one cycle. 
In this experiment, we have set the number of cycles required to iden-
tify malicious neighbors to be 2. Therefore, it is reasonable that many 
of the nodes are unable to discover its malicious neighbors while they 
move around. It shows that the neighbor monitoring power does not 
perform so effectively in highly mobile network environment. In order 
to protect the network security, it is necessary to rely on other security 
operations, like the identification of suspicious nodes in public key cer-
tifications. The experiments result will be presented in the following 
sub-sections. 
Evaluation on Ratings with Neighbor Monitoring and Isolation of 
Suspicious Nodes 
To improve the security of the network, we include the identification 
of suspicious nodes in the operations of public key certification. In 
this experiment, suspicious nodes are not only be identified by neigh-
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bor monitoring and the trust value of the target node in public key 
certifications. Also, they can be identified by analyzing the received 
public key certificates. The introducers who provide certificates differ-
ent from the others are identified as suspicious and be isolated from 
being selected as introducers. Suspicious nodes are present in cases 
2, 3，4, 6，and 7. It should be noted that case 2 and 6 lead to false 
positive error. It means that a honest node may be falsely identified 
as malicious. Case 9 leads to false negative rate as well as the single 
reply can makes no comparisons with other certificates, so it is always 
thought to be correct. 
Figure 6.19 shows the experiment result with n=40, m=0.3 and 
r=100. The successful rate is greatly improved with the identification 
of suspicious nodes during the process of public key certification. The 
failure rate is very low. It indicates that the identification and isola-
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tion of suspicious nodes in cases 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 effectively avoid the 
number of incorrect public certificates replied by malicious introduc-
ers. The high successful rate and the low failure rate bring satisfactory 
authentication results in the network. 
Figure 6.20 shows the experiment result with n=100, m=0.3 and 
r=100. The successful rate is not so high in this case, though the failure 
rate is greatly reduced to only 10%. The successful rate was found to be 
lower than 70%, but the failure rate is much lower than the percentage 
of malicious nodes 30% in the network. The unsatisfactory successful 
rate is mainly due to the high unreachable rate. W e believe that it is 
because cases 3 and 6 lead to false positive error in identification of 
suspicious nodes. 
Figure 6.21 shows the experiment result with n=40，772=0.7 and 
r=100. The successful rate is just between 60% and 70% which is 
CHAPTER 6. SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS 103 
Rates to No. of Cycles with ii=40t.Yn:Q.."7,:and Suspicious Nodes ui cases 2,3,4,6,7 
100 一 -一 . . - — — 
90 
SO — 
I 60 、、 ‘ Z " ^ ^ 一 F^ iWRs^ te 
50 — — —A— UwewsliftbU Rsite 
.含 40 False-Positive Rate 
3 — « - False-Negative R&fe 
30 . — 
—V _ 4 • 
20 ~.^^pyt^ : 二 〜• • 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
No. of .Cyclts 
Figure 6.21: Rates to No. of Cycles with n=40, m二0.7, r=100, and Suspi-
cious Nodes in cases 2,3,4,6,7 
not so satisfactory. The failure is pretty low on the other hand. W e 
notice that the unreachable rate is pretty high, which leads to the 
low successful rate. It is because many of the honest nodes are falsely 
identified as suspicious and isolated from taking the role of introducers. 
Ill a hostile environment, where the number of honest nodes is low, it 
is easy to lead to the problem of not enough introducers. This is the 
major reason for the high unreachable rate as well. 
Figure 6.22 shows the experiment result with n二 100，m=0.7 and 
r=100. Similar to the previous figure, the successful rate is low and 
the unreachable is high. Under a network with high malicious rate, the 
situation becomes worse as the number of case 3 and 6 increases. The 
honest nodes in the network are not many under a network with 70% of 
malicious nodes. If they are falsely identified as suspicious and not be 
selected as introducers, then a requesting may not find enough number 
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of introducers in the request of public key certificates. To improve the 
successful rate and reduce the unreachable rate, we have to reduce the 
false-positive error rate. The experiment in the next sub-section will 
focus on this problem. 
Evaluation on Ratings with Neighbor Monitoring and Isolation of 
Malicious Nodes 
Similar to the previous experiment, suspicious nodes can be identified 
by neighbor monitoring and update the trust value of the target node 
ill public key certification in this experiment. Unlike the pervious ex-
periment, the requesting node will avoid to identify suspicious nodes in 
some cases where it expects trust-worthy introducers still exist in that 
reply. It means in the cases that the requesting node is able to identify 
malicious introducers confidently, like in case 3 and 6, the node may 
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consider to keep all the suspicious introducers instead of isolating all of 
them. Although it is hard to make the judgement on keep the introduc-
ers or not, a node still can try to do it by considering the trust values 
of the introducers and their past records in public key certifications. 
If this policy is carried out, it is possible to avoids the false-positive 
errors brought by cases 3 and 6. However, the reduce of false-positive 
error also prevents some malicious nodes to be isolated immediately in 
cases 3 and 6. Anyway, these malicious nodes can still be discovered 
in the future when they are requested to be introducers again. 
Figure 6.23 shows that the successful rate is quite high and the 
failure rate is almost zero after running for 100 cycles. It indicates 
that the new policy on the identification of suspicious nodes brings 
satisfactory result in public key certifications. However, when compares 
with Figure 6.19 in the previous, the successful rate in this figure is not 
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as good as that. The main reason is that some of the malicious nodes 
are not isolated in cases 3 and 6, so it takes longer time for a node to 
discover the malicious nodes in the network. When the malicious nodes 
are not isolated, they are still possible to be selected as introducers and 
provide with false certificates which may decrease the successful rate. 
Figure 6.24 shows the successful rate is greatly improved with this 
strategy. It maintains a high successful rate under a hostile situation 
and with extremely low failure rate. It indicates that the new strategy 
on the identification of suspicious nodes brings satisfactory result in 
public key certifications in a hostile network environment. In compar-
ison with Figure 6.21, the successful rate is greatly improved with the 
unreachable rate greatly reduced as well. In an environment full of 
malicious nodes, it is hard to find enough number of trust-worthy in-
troducers for public key certifications. Therefore, the keeping of honest 
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introducer in cases 3 and 6 can make a great different in the results as 
it provides the requesting more choices on selecting trust-worthy nods 
as introducers for certification. It effectively increases the successful 
rate and decreases the unreachable rate in the network. 
In conclusion, the new strategy on keeping some of the introducers 
in a failure public key certification avoids the false-positive errors in 
the network. This effectively reduces the unreachable rate especially in 
a hostile network environment where trust-worthy nodes are extremely 
valuable. It is understandable that deciding isolate or not is sometimes 
an uneasy task to the requesting node. A node is suggested to make the 
decision by referencing not only the public key certificates received, but 
also the trust value and past records of the introducers. W e believe that 
the simple approach on isolating all the suspicious nodes which provide 
with different certificates, which presented in the previous experiment, 
can be adopted in a less hostile environment. In such an environment, 
higher number of trust-worthy nodes are usually available to be poten-
tial introducers, so the false-positive errors do not give too much bad 
effects to the network. It also provides a faster way to isolate malicious 
nodes then the new approach. However, in an environment with high 
percentage of malicious nodes, it is recommended to adopted the ap-
proach with more relax strategy on identification of suspicious nodes. 
This approach leaves the malicious nodes serving the network, rather 
then removing the small portions of trust-worthy nodes. If we select 
the appropriate strategy according to different network conditions, our 
authentication service is expected to perform better. 
• E n d of chapter. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this work aims at providing a secure, scalable and dis-
tributed authentication service that assures the correctness of public 
key certification in wireless ad hoc networks with the presence of ma-
licious nodes. Our system does not rely on any trusted-third party, 
such that authentication is performed in a distributed manner. New 
nodes are introduced by other trust-worthy nodes in the same group. 
Nodes ill the network monitor the behavior of each other and update 
their trust tables accordingly. W e suggest a well-defined trust model 
and a network model to develop our public key authentication services. 
The trust model allows nodes to monitor and update trust values of 
each other in a distributed manner. The network model is clustering-
based which makes it convenient to behavior monitoring and provides 
high available on public key certification. Based on the above models, 
we propose a new inechanisin to perform public key authentication in 
wireless ad hoc networks. The security operations proposed include 
carrying out public key certification and update of trust tables in a 
novel way. Also, there are operations enable a node to discover and 
isolate malicious nodes which sign false public key certificates. 
108 
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Extensive experiments are completed to evaluate the performance 
of our authentication protocol in the security perspective. A number of 
metrics, including the successful rate, fail rate, unreachable rate, false-
positive and false-negative error rates are evaluated. Parameters like 
the percentage of trust-worthy nodes and percentage of malicious nodes 
in the network are fixed at different values in certain experiments. In 
addition, comparison is made between the authentication service we 
propose and the P G P approach with distributed certificate repository. 
The experiment results show that our authentication service performs 
well ill protecting the network security in a hostile environment. Apart 
from that, a number of experiments are run to demonstrate the net-
work formation arid maintenance algorithms are adaptive to mobility 
of nodes and able to keep the network in a balance clustering struc-
ture. The neighbor monitoring power and different strategies on the 
identification of suspicious nodes are implemented as well. Experiment 
results show the effectiveness in providing secure authentication service 
using different strategies in various adversary levels. In conclusion, our 
approach provides a secure and highly available authentication service 
in wireless ad hoc network. 
Ill the future, the work may be extended to handle the existence of 
malicious peers in the network. More advance security operations will 
be included to prevent the harms from the colluding nodes. 
• E n d of chapter. 
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